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Blasting the Farm: Chemical High Explosives and the Rise of Industrial Agriculture,
1867-1930
Chairperson: Kyle G. Volk
This thesis explores the golden age of chemical high explosives in American
agriculture. It argues that the interactions of ordinary farmers, chemical manufacturers,
and the agricultural state reinvented chemical high explosives as implements that farmers
would use to restructure and manage agricultural ecosystems. By the second decade of
the twentieth century dynamite had become a normal feature of the farm. While ordinary
farmers used dynamite in everyday tasks to intensify crop production, chemical
manufacturers and the agricultural state further promoted dynamite farming while
simultaneously bolstering secondary industries such as irrigation and other land
reclamation projects associated with extensive agricultural developments. As chemical
high explosives helped Americans expand agriculture into new regions, new
environmental barriers to crop production emerged. These barriers necessitated further
inputs of capital and energy in agricultural production which catalyzed the movement
towards intensive agriculture that is intimately linked to modern industrial agricultural
practices. A mechanical implements and a new form of energy, chemical high explosives
helped catalyze the development of industrial agriculture in this period of American
history.
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Introduction
In January 1913, H. O. Daniels of the Millbrook Farm in Middletown, Connecticut,
marveled at the power of dynamite before the Vermont Draymen’s Association’s forty-third
annual meeting in Burlington, Vermont. Daniels explained how he transformed a field of
“chestnut and oak timbers” into “a splendid crop of corn” in just a single year.1 In the fall of
1910, Daniels and three hired laborers had begun the arduous task of digging up by hand the tree
stumps that spotted his Connecticut farm. After a single week of work and minimal progress,
Daniels abandoned the project as “too expensive a proposition.” Just a few months later, Daniels
discovered a new and popular method of removing stumps—dynamite. With a small investment
in “300 pounds of this powerful explosive,” Daniels made quick work of the pesky hardwoods
that stood between him and a bountiful harvest.2
Daniels addressed one of the biggest problems farmers in wooded areas faced, the tree
stump. The cost of labor and time required to remove these barriers to agricultural progress were
so great that many farmers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century left them in place.3
Stump-filled land not only limited the acreage available for planting; It also prevented farmers
from employing such new forms of mechanization as ridding plows, manure spreaders and
eventually tractors—all of which were much less effective in stump-plagued fields. While some
invested in mechanical and horse powered stump twisters, neither matched dynamite’s
efficiency.4 Mitigating costs, reducing the need for labor, and clearing the way for new

1

F. H. Bickford, Report of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting of the Vermont Dairymen’s Association at
Burlington, Vermont, January 8, 9, 1913 (St. Albans: St. Albans Messenger Co., 1913), 35-39.
2
Ibid., 37.
3
“Use of Dynamite on the Farm,” American Farmer, (December 1876).
4
University of Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 163: Investigations in Costs and
Methods of Clearing Land, 1916; This experiment showed that dynamite proved exponentially more
efficient in removing stumps than mechanical and horse powered devices. It showed that in a single day
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technological advancements, dynamite fueled farm mechanization in this period of American
agricultural history.
This thesis explores the golden age of chemical high explosives in American agriculture.
Invented in 1867 by Swedish chemist Alfred Nobel, dynamite, one of the earliest and most
common chemical high explosives, marked a distinct shift in the history of explosive power.
Chemical high explosives’ utility resulted from the fact that explosives straddle the line between
energy and mechanization. Much like coal and oil, high explosives’ value emanated from the
potential energy stored in their chemical bonds. Unlike these other forms of energy, explosives
did not require an external apparatus, such as steam or internal combustion engines, to harness
their power. Instead, the mechanical forces of dynamite transferred directly, by way of rapidly
expanding gasses, to whatever solid matter it encountered. In the second half of the nineteenth
century, manufacturers of explosives primarily marketed dynamite, nitroglycerine and other high
explosives to the mining and construction industries. But in this same period, farmers gradually
began to harness its “concentrated power.” By 1920, farmers regularly used chemical high
explosives in agriculture.5
This thesis argues that the interactions of ordinary farmers, chemical manufacturers, and
the agricultural state reinvented chemical high explosives as implements that farmers would use
to restructure and manage agricultural ecosystems. By the second decade of the twentieth
century, dynamite had become a normal feature of the farm. While ordinary farmers used
dynamite in everyday tasks to intensify crop production, chemical manufacturers and the

dynamite removed 70 stumps, the horse puller uprooted 61, and the “man-powered” stump puller
completed only 24.
5
Decomposition is the term used to describe the breaking of molecular bonds, which releases energy
stored within those bonds. The slower rate of black powder’s decomposition results in burning while
nitroglycerine’s molecules decompose simultaneously producing an explosive blast; The Buffalo,
Rochester and Pittsburg Railway Company, Intensive Farming and Use of Dynamite (July, 1911).
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agricultural state further promoted dynamite farming while simultaneously bolstering secondary
industries such as irrigation and other land reclamation projects. These efforts expanded the
nation’s total acreage of farms. A mechanical implement and a new form of energy, dynamite
catalyzed agricultural industrialization in the early twentieth century.
Media coverage and promotional literature aided chemical high explosive’s transition to
the farm. Farmers’ organizations and popular media outlets broadcast stories of inventive
farmers and land clearing businesses that experimented with dynamite while state-sponsored
experiment stations and agricultural colleges tested and reported on the various uses of dynamite
in food production in the late nineteenth century. By the twentieth century, this knowledge
proliferated, and chemical manufacturers developed farm-specific high explosives, initiated
advertisement campaigns, and published promotional literature that helped further democratize
explosive agriculture. At once this process aided in the reapplication of chemical high explosives
in agriculture and transferred knowledge of blasting techniques, held almost exclusively by
blasting engineers in the nineteenth century, to ordinary farmers who consumed no less than
20,000,000 pounds of dynamite annually by the 1920s.6
The importance of chemical high explosives in the rise of industrial agriculture
transcends their growing popularity among farmers. The engineers of early-twentieth-century
land reclamation projects utilized new explosive technologies in their efforts to repurpose idol
lands into productive and well-managed farmlands. This expansion of chemical high explosives
in agriculture had major environmental and economic consequences. Americans used chemical

6

“New Markets For Implement Dealers,” Power Farming: The Magazine of Farming With Mechanical
Power Vol. 28, No. (April 1919), 34; Davis Dyer and David B. Sicilia, Labors of a Modern Hercules:
Evolution of a Chemical Company (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1990), 34, 117; Arthur Pine
Van Gelder and Hugo Schlatter, History of the Explosives Industry in America (New York: Arno Press,
1927), 1070.
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high explosives to conform irrational landscapes and environments to their rationalized visions
of industrial agriculture. The Reclamation Service, established through the National Reclamation
Act of 1902, furnished funding and engineering expertise as contracted laborers blasted irrigation
networks to water desert farms. State and local farmers’ and land clearing associations
dynamited cutover forest land for farming in wooded regions and drained swamps to grow crops
in the nation’s low lands. Ordinary farmers, blasting their own farms, followed suit. Dynamite
agriculture sterilized existing ecosystems for the sole purpose of agricultural production. While
these efforts created millions of new acres of farmland, environmental barriers such as climate
and soil conditions created new dependencies on mechanical implements, often distant water
sources, and increasingly, chemical fertilizers required to sustain agricultural production in these
environments that were historically unsuitable for cultivation.7 Dynamite then was a marvel and
a miracle, but one that would push the need for further human innovation and reinvention.
Dynamite agriculture influenced economic conditions of the 1920s. Ecological
transformations with explosives created new farms and made many existing ones more
productive, but this fueled economic instability in agricultural markets. Used to put maximum
acreage into cultivation and to intensify farming practices, dynamite agriculture fostered
overproduction. Reacting to the global food shortages of World War I, the federal government
bolstered land reclamation efforts, which utilized high explosives, to restructure ecosystems for
agriculture and encouraged farmers to put every available acre into cultivation. As a result, prices
for land and farm products skyrocketed. Heeding the call to action, farmers purchased land at
exorbitant prices and intensified production by explosive means. But by the 1920s, the war had

7

US Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, First Annual Report of the Reclamation Service
From June 17 to December 1, 1902 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903); Minutes and
Papers of the Third Annual Tri-State Development Congress of Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota
(March 2-3, 1922).
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ended and increased acreage and efficiency in agriculture outpaced global demand for farm
goods. Farm prices fell, reclaimed land often failed to meet productive expectations, and many
farmers suffered greatly.8
The use of high explosives in the development of American agriculture at times did not
meet the expectations of contemporaries. In stump removal, ditch digging, and tree planting,
dynamite proved largely more efficient and effective than traditional hand and animal-powered
labor, but it was not a panacea for all farm troubles. Though farmers tried, dynamite could not
create rain and did not counteract the nearly limitless number of factors that determined quality
crop yields.9 Even with dynamite, environmental conditions fostered economic uncertainty on
American farms. While the use of chemical high explosives in reclamation projects helped water
deserts and cleared stumps from cutover land, crop yields in many of the transformed regions fell
short of the Reclamation Service’s and U.S. Department of Agriculture’s estimations. The
embrace of chemical high explosives also introduced a new degree of danger to the farm that was
inherent to the product. The fruits of dynamite’s versatility and efficiency were often at the cost
of personal safety as farmers and workers literally risked life and limb in their efforts to
industrialize American agriculture.10

8

“The World Faces Famine,” Vertical Farming Vol. 1, No. 2 (March 1915), 3; Willard W. Cochrane, The
Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1993), 114-120.
9
Robert G. Dyrenforth, “Can We Make it Rain?,” The North American Review, (Oct. 1891), “Rain
Making in Texas,” Scientific American, (Nov. 21, 1891); “Dynamite Rain Making,” Scientific American,
(Sep. 23, 1893).
10
Powers v. Harlow, 53 Michigan, 507, (1884).
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Despite the rising ubiquity of dynamite in the late nineteenth-century industrial
agricultural landscape, its history has yet to be critically analyzed.11 While works of popular
history have used dynamite as a framing tool to tell broad narratives about a modernizing world,
this thesis is the first scholarly history of dynamite’s applications in industrial agriculture and
joins with scholars exploring the vast implications of changing sources of energy in the late
nineteenth century.12 Chemical high explosives supplanted black powder and supplemented
human and animal power beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, providing
contemporaries with access to energy previously unattainable. Historians have traditionally
emphasized the importance of coal, oil, and electricity as improvements over energy sources
such as wind, water, and wood while also studying the role of the government in promoting new
industries.13 Bringing dynamite into these conversations elevates the importance of new forms of
energy in America’s burgeoning industrial economy and in turn expands traditional
understandings of new energy to include explosives.
The rise of chemical high explosive agriculture also shows the importance of chemical
innovation to the processes of farm mechanization. Traditionally, scholars of industrial
agriculture argue that mechanical innovation preceded both chemical and biological

11

The one exception to this is Louis Adamic’s, Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America (New
York: The Viking Press, 1934). Adamic uses dynamite as a lens to the history of class violence and labor
unrest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
12
Stephen R. Brown. A Most Damnable Invention: Dynamite, Nitrates, and the Making of the Modern
World (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2005) positions dynamite and nitrates as central to a broad
range of “modern developments.” This is a global history that begins in 424 b.c. and concludes in 2005.
Largely a historical narrative, this book does not access the direct application of dynamite or chemical
high explosives in agriculture.
13
Harold L. Platt, The Electric City: Energy and the Growth of the Chicago Area, 1880-1930 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991); Paul Sabin, Crude Politics: the California Oil Market, 1900-1940
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Thomas Andrews, Killing for Coal: America’s
Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).
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developments on the farm.14 But farmers employed chemical high explosives to remove stumps
and facilitate the implementation of new mechanical technologies as early as the 1870s. Studying
explosives as chemical energy reveals the overlap between mechanical and chemical
developments on the American farm and in turn uncovers the importance of chemical technology
in both periods of farm development.
This thesis also places the rise of industrial agriculture in conversation with the expansion
of the bureaucratic state. As in other industries, late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
Americans looked for ways to streamline, organize, and professionalize agricultural production.
Generally, scholars contend that these trends gave rise to the bureaucratic state, which in
agriculture manifested in the establishment of the Reclamation Service, the United States
Department of Agriculture, experiment stations, and extension services.15 Analyzing high
explosives, this thesis shows how efforts to streamline agriculture went beyond the development
of bureaucratic structures and translated in the reorganization or rationalization of nature as
farmers used dynamite to create highly managed agroecosystems.16
Studying chemical high explosives as both energy and technology, this thesis
problematizes the role of new energy in the history of technologies like irrigation and the
railroads. Scholars have stressed the importance of railroads networks in shaping rural and

14

Willard W. Cochrane, The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Yujiro Hayami and Vernon Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An
International Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
15
For examples see: Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967);
Gary Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding to the
Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); Willard W. Cochrane, The Development of
American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993)
16
While modern scientists use the term agroecology in many different ways, a general summation of the
term is “the science of the relationships of organisms in an environment purposefully transformed by man
for crop or livestock production.” For more on agroecology and agroecosystems see Konrad Martin and
Joachim Sauerborn, Agroecology (Dordrechts: Springer Science and Business Media, 2013).
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western development, highlighted the role of irrigations systems in creating socioeconomic
dependencies on engineering expertise, and detailed the environmental consequences of such
projects.17 The importance of these developments is undeniable, but scholars have all but ignored
the significance of new forms of chemical energy in the construction of these works. Historians
have also argued that railroads contributed to the opening up of new lands, promoted western
settlement, supported scientific agriculture, and introduced a capitalist logic to a North American
hinterland.18 This emphasis has overshadowed the importance of other technological advances,
specifically within the realm of agricultural history. Chemical high explosives provide a window
into the ways in which burgeoning chemical companies such as E. I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company and Hercules Powder Company also contributed to these developments directly
through booster campaigns, collaboration with government experiment stations and agricultural
colleges, publication of informational literature, and indirectly through the creation of a product
that aided countless industrial developments upon which industrial agriculture depended.
Chemical high explosives provide an ideal lens to explore American agriculture in this
period of significant change. The nature of agricultural work, varying from region to region, state
to state, and even farm to farm, makes writing a national narrative difficult. But dynamite’s
versatility in application made it popular with farmers across the country. Further, the history of
explosive agriculture reflects themes of nineteenth-century optimism as it related to burgeoning
scientific discoveries and Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of “creative destruction.” Creative

17

Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1985); Donald J. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade
in California and the West, 1850-1931 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Orsi, Sunset
Limited (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005).
18
William Cronon, Natures Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York, W.W. Norton and
Company, 1991); Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011); Richard J. Orsi, Sunset Limited: The Southern Pacific
Railroad and the Development of the American West (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005).
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destruction is traditionally understood as “the necessity of capitalism always to uproot the old in
order to institute the new.”19 This thesis employs a more literal usage of the phrase “creative
destruction” to describe the literal destruction, wrought by chemical high explosives, which
cleared the way for industrial capitalist expansion. As farmers, chemical manufacturers, and the
state creatively reinvented dynamite as a farm implement, they redefined the nature of farm labor
and eroded landscapes in their economically motivated efforts to industrialize American
agriculture.
Chapter One explores the history of dynamite on the American farm from its early and
sporadic applications starting in the 1870s through its much more extensive use in the age of
agricultural extension up to 1920. It argues that the interactions of ordinary farmers, chemical
manufacturers, and the agricultural state gradually reinvented dynamite as a farm tool. It
investigates the ways in which farmers, across the ecologically and geographically diverse
regions of North America, employed chemical high explosives in conjunction with other forms
of mechanization and how, as a new form of energy, it aided American farmers’ ability to
overcome environmental barriers to productivity that were inherent to their specific regions. It
also reveals the importance of the agricultural state and chemical manufacturers in further
propagating dynamite’s agricultural uses. By World War I, these actors elevated dynamite
agriculture from its experimental stage into a common practice as they regularly used dynamite
to meet wartime demands for food.
Chapter Two focuses on the importance of chemical high explosives in land reclamation
projects that directed the course of agricultural development. It argues that new high explosives
aided the construction of irrigation works, cutover land reclamation, and small-scale

19

White, Railroaded, xxv.

9

improvements on individual farms. These actions created highly managed ecosystems intended
for crop production. At times, these changes facilitated mechanization, created new dependencies
of chemical fertilizers, and fueled the overproduction of farm products that plagued agricultural
markets throughout the 1920s. The development of these lands in turn revealed the limitations of
explosive energy in land reclamation, highlighting the uncalculated labors of the agricultural
state and ordinary farmers who overestimated the potential productivity of lands reclassified as
suitable for farming.
Due to the limitations of a master’s thesis, a lack of sources, and restrictions on time, this
project gives only limited attention to the importance of chemical high explosives in other
industrial development such as mining, construction, and infrastructural projects beyond
irrigation. While this project investigates the broad consequences of World War I on agricultural
production and the reception of explosive farm techniques, it does not examine the military
history of these products and the role they played in the changing nature of warfare in this
period. Instead, the goal of this thesis is to illuminate the processes through which chemical high
explosive shaped modern agricultural practices and to raise new questions about the
sustainability and ecological viability of these developments.

10

Chapter 1:
Breaking New Ground: The Democratization of Chemical High explosives in American
Agriculture
“Yesterday irrigation was the big word in agricultural development; today the biggest
term in the farming vocabulary is dynamite.” In 1911, almost half a century after Alfred Nobel
invented dynamite, Samuel Wesley Long, contributor to National Magazine, praised the valuable
offerings of dynamite in the development of American agriculture. Admiring dynamite’s ability
to pacify common farmland nuisances such as “stumps, boulders, hardpan, worked-out top-soil”
and “swamp land,” Long explained that “this land can be made to laugh into harvest when
awakened from its sleep by the dynamite blast.”20 In using chemical high explosives as farming
implements, farmers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century addressed these barriers to
agrarian expansion in new and profound ways, and by the 1920s, farming with dynamite helped
create the productive farmlands that spanned North America’s diverse geography.
Before Americans imagined dynamite as a farm tool, the nation’s mining and
construction industries used chemical high explosives to extract resources, erect cities, and
establish the country’s infrastructural networks. These developments were largely made possible
through chemical high explosives’ versatility in commercial applications. As William S. Dutton,
historian of the E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, explained in 1942, “Dynamite is
distinctly an industrial tool. It may be used incidentally in war as a demolition agent, but it
cannot be fired successfully in guns.”21 As such, the history of dynamite closely follows that of
the major industrial developments in the postbellum United States.

20

“Greater than Irrigation,” National Magazine (May 1911), 319.
William S. Dutton, Du Pont: One Hundred and Forty Du Pont: One Hundred and Forty Years (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1942), 152.

21
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Not initially intended for agricultural work, dynamite underwent a series of reinventions
before it came to impress twentieth-century commentators like Samuel Wesley Long. The
interplay and exchange between ordinary farmers, chemical manufactures, and critical arms of
the agricultural state that occurred over the half century from the invention of dynamite to the
end of World War I reinvented dynamite as a tool for the farm. Publicity of the media, farmers’
organizations and cooperatives, government publications, and business advertisement campaigns
aided this process, and by the 1920s, these developments normalized dynamite agriculture.
Facing economic hardships throughout the nineteenth century, many farmers used
dynamite to address the demands of changing economic, social and cultural life.22 This tumult
released creative energies across rural America, which in some cases manifested as the
reimagination of dynamite as a farm implement that aided farmers’ broader efforts to save time,
labor, and money in the movement towards farm mechanization in this period.
By the late 1880s, state and federal governments established agricultural colleges and
experiment stations to generate knowledge of the agricultural sciences and disseminate
information about best practice. While colleges researched and published literature, federal
county agents demonstrated the new techniques for American farmers.23 Where at once the
innovation of individual farmers inspired new publicly funded experiments, so too did extension
work further inspire farmers to employ these new techniques. Chemical manufacturers engaged
in this process of knowledge production as well. Advertisement campaigns portrayed dynamite
and other blasting elements as universally effective farm tools, which stirred interest among
farmers and inspired new testing at agricultural experiment. Manufacturers emphasized the

22

Willard W. Cochrane, The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 93-94.
23
Jeffery W. Moss and Cynthia B. Lass, “A History of Farmers’ Institutes,” Agricultural History Vol. 62,
No. 2 (Spring 1988), 150-151.
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safety of their products and even developed farm-specific high explosives. 24 These efforts
helped transfer knowledge, exclusively held by highly experienced explosives engineers in the
nineteenth century, to farm laborers who were hesitant to embrace explosive because of safety
concerns and dynamite’s reputation as a tool for political radicalism.25
In 1914, the outbreak of World War I further exacerbated interest in dynamite agriculture
as global food shortages catalyzed efforts to put maximum acreage under cultivation.26
Expanding experiment station activity, new advertisement campaigns, and increased
demonstration work exposed a large number of American farmers to the fruits of dynamite’s
labors. Dynamite became the explosive of the Homefront portrayed as both essential to national
prosperity and useful in addressing farmers’ desires to modernize their farms.
At once, chemical high explosives reshaped farming practices, facilitated farm
mechanization, and recast Americans’ perception of dynamite. This was a vital component of

24

Nearly all of the E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company’s promotions of agricultural explosives
addressed the safety of their products. For examples see, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Farming
with Dynamite: An Improvement in Farming that is Proving Greater than Irrigation (Wilmington: 1911);
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, The history of the E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Company: A
Century of Progress (New York: Business America, 1912); “Improved Red Cross Dynamite,” Du Pont
Magazine Vol. 2, No. 2 (February 1914), 3; “Safe Handling of Dynamite,” New Farms for Old Through
Deep Plowing, with Du Pont Red Cross Low Freezing Dynamite (Wilmington, 1911), 31; “Safe Handling
of Dynamite,” Du Pont Farmer’s Handbook: Instruction in the Use of Dynamite for Clearing Planting
and Cultivating Trees, Drainage, Ditching and Subsoiling (Wilmington, 1912), 108.
25
For examples see: For examples, see Louis Adamic, Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America
(New York: The Viking Press, 1934); James Green, Death in the Haymarket: A Story of Chicago, the
First Labor Movement and the Bombing that Divided Gilded Age America (New York: Anchor Books,
2006).
26
Cochrane, The Development of American Agriculture, 99. For examples of how explosives
manufactures engaged the agricultural markets see E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Farming with
Dynamite: An Improvement in Farming that is Proving Greater than Irrigation (Wilmington: 1911), 21,
23; Davis Dyer and David B. Sicilia, “Demobilization and Diversification, 1918-1920,” Labors of a
Modern Hercules: Evolution of a Chemical Company (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1990),
111-141; E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, The history of the E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder
Company: A Century of Progress (New York: Business America, 1912); Du Pont Magazine Vol. 2, No. 2
(February 1914); Du Pont, New Farms for Old (Wilmington, 1911), and Du Pont, Du Pont Farmer’s
Handbook (Wilmington, 1912).
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agricultural industrialization as chemical high explosives helped to reshape both the nature of
farm labor and the physical appearances of the farms upon which this labor was conducted.
Employed as a time and laborsaving devise, dynamite facilitated farm mechanization. In
application, dynamite increased inputs of capital and energy to expand production. The very
nature of chemical high explosives as a physically destructive device was also important.
Associations with violence, embodied in the early days of dynamite’s existence, were never
removed from American consciousness, but dynamite was no longer exclusively associated with
radical foreigners pursuing social and political gains by the 1920s. At least for the farmers, it
became a means of achieving economic security facilitated by the violent expansion of chemical
gases that crumbled barriers to nature’s commodifiable goods.
An Industrial Explosive, 1867-1877
On September 24, 1876, the explosive powers of dynamite calmed Hell Gate, a tidal
straight that terrorized vessels in New York’s East River. On the downstream side of Long Island
Sounds, Hallett’s point and the waters of Hell Gate “formed the principle obstruction to New
York Harbor” until 1876.27 As early as 1665, sailors dreaded this perilous passage, and in 1872,
it was estimated that nearly 1000 ships a year “were wrecked or seriously damaged” while
navigating its waters. That same year, a contributor to the Science Record lamented, “More harm
is suffered and more risks incurred here in a space of 2000 yards, than in all the rest of the
navigable waters this side of New-York to the farthest extremity of the Sound.”28

27

“How Gen. Newton Raised Hell-Gate,” Indiana School Journal: Organ of the State Teachers’
Association and of the Superintendent of Public Instruction Vol. 21 (Indianapolis, 1876), 515, 516;
28
Alfred Ely Beach, ed., “The Government Work at Helgate,” Science Record For 1872: A Compendium
of Scientific Progress and Discovery During the Past Year (New York: Munn and Company, Office of
the “Scientific American,” 1872), 10-12.
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Contemporaries saw Hell Gate and Hallett’s Point as a danger to their ships and as a
major barrier to economic development. While the erratic currents of Hell Gate proved
hazardous to ships of all sizes, it was the shallow depths as low as eight feet that stood as the
primary barrier for large vessels. The exclusion of larger ships from entering New York Harbor
proved “hurtful to commerce.” In 1851, Mons. Maillefert made the first attempt to tame Hell
Gate. Granted $15,000 by the New York City Chamber of Commerce, Maillefert embarked on a
three-year effort to remove Pot Rock, Frying Pan, and Way’s Reef—three aquatic features that
barred entry to the port. Detonating submerged charges of black powder, Maillefert crumbled the
reefs and calmed Hell Gate’s currents. But the shallow depths of the passage continued to bar
entry.29 It was clear the powers of black powder were not enough to overcome the natural
barriers to the development of New York Harbor.
After the Civil War, discussion of Hell Gate’s conversion “into a safe highway for
commerce” emerged once again. In 1868, the War Department assigned Brevet Major-General
Newton to the project and granted him $85,000 from a congressional fund established for the
purposes of public works in rivers and harbors. Armed with recently invented chemical high
explosives, Newton engaged in a seven-year improvement project that finally overcame the
environmental barriers to New York Harbor. At completion, Newton and his workers used
28,901 pounds of dynamite and 9,061 and a half cartridges of rendrock, another nitroglycerinbased explosive, to erode the river bottom to new depths. According to the project’s final report,
the high explosives successfully altered the passage allowing vessels that drew “12 feet of water”
to pass within 70 yards of the shore and ships drawing 19 feet to “pass within 100 yards.”30

29

Ibid., 12.
“The Great Blast,” The Sailor’s Magazine and Seamen’s Friend Vol. 28, No. 11 (November 1876),
336-337.

30
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The conversion of the Hell Gate tidal straight into a navigable waterway is emblematic of
dynamite’s increasingly common role in late-nineteenth-century industrial development.
Constructing New York’s Catskill aqueduct, workers used over 17 million pounds of dynamite,
and California’s Los Angeles aqueduct depended on the use of gelatin dynamite’s to excavate the
irrigation project’s 26,870-foot Elizabethan Tunnel with record breaking speed.31 These new and
powerful explosives were also imperative to the construction of the nation’s railways where
between 1870 and 1890, workers laid 114,955 miles of new tracks with the help of dynamite and
other high explosives. In 1898, Henry de Mosenthal, contributor to Eclectic Magazine of Foreign
Literature, professed, “The invention of dynamite marks an epoch in the history of
civilization.”32 By 1900, it was clear that the chemical energies of high explosive laid the
foundation for many of the United States’ major industrial works.
Following its invention in 1867, dynamite was primary used in mining and construction
ventures. Less than a year after Alfred Nobel patented his new explosive, he licensed Julius
Bandmann and the Giant Powder Company of San Francisco, California, to manufacture and sell
his dynamite, and small powder firms across the country began to produce their own unique
formulations of the high explosive. Dynamite soon gained popularity among construction
workers and mining engineers who marveled at dynamite’s superiority to black blasting powder,
and by the late 1870s, dynamite disrupted the explosives market enough to catch the attention of
major black powder producers such as E. I du Pont de Nemours and Company and Laflin and
Rand Powder Company. Du Pont and Laflin & Rand joined forces to create the Repauno
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Chemical Company in 1879. Through Repauno, the companies brought dynamite into the wellorganized explosives market they had established through the Gunpowder Trade Association,
which fashioned regional markets and minimum price controls to ensure stability and restrict
unwanted competition.33 Because early demand originated primarily from construction and
mining operation, these became the target markets for nineteenth-century chemical
manufacturers. As chemical high explosives flourished in these industries, it caught the attention
of farmers and land reclamation companies that explored the potential the benefits of dynamite in
their own professions.
Dynamite Reimagined, 1877-1887
“Now that Hell Gate is blown up, some ingenious individual has set to work to see what
can be done in the same line with that universal farm nuisance” reported the Independent
Stateman in 1877. Inspired by dynamite’s ability to bring economic opportunity to New York
Harbor, this inventive farmer explored the explosive’s merits against his own barriers to
economic success—the stump. Blasting out his stumps with dynamite, this individual completed
what “would have been a hard days work for two or more good men” in half a day. He “proved
not only the thorough effectiveness of the new method, but its economy in cost and in time.” 34
Ordinary farmers were one of the first groups to explore the merits of dynamite agriculture.
Between 1865 and 1896, the prices of farm products in large part declined as wheat prices fell
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over 75 percent and corn prices drop nearly 66 percent.35 Plagued with extended economic
depression, ordinary farmers reimagined dynamite as a farm implement to save time and labor.
By the 1920s, dynamite shaped the face of agriculture as an industry in the United States,
but before this transformation happened, dynamite underwent a series of reinventions.
Individuals like the unnamed farmer and farmers’ organizations creatively employed dynamite in
their own economic pursuits reapplying it as a tool for the farm. These applications inspired
others to reimagine dynamite’s potential and fueled further reinventions creating the process
through which dynamite came to be widely accepted as an agricultural implement.
For most of the mid to late-nineteenth century, local and regional farmers’ institutes
informed farmers about the latest methods of farming with informational lectures and literature.
As early as the 1850s, state boards of agriculture took an interest in establishing and promoting
farmers institutes with the explicit purpose of delivering lectures on best practice and the science
of agriculture. Federally, the government supported American farmers in the early 1860s through
the transfer of public lands to the states for the establishment of agricultural colleges as well as
through the establishment of the United States Department of Agriculture, which for most of the
1860s, 70s, and 80s distributed seeds to farmers across the country.36 The media also spread
information through trade journals and newspapers. In sharing information about creative
reinventions of dynamite, the media, along with farmers’ institutes were crucial to dynamite’s
reapplication. Though the state and media played an active role in prompting new methods of
agriculture in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was ordinary farmers who first
reimagined dynamite in their efforts to cleanse their farms of tree stumps and boulders.

35

Cochrane, Development of American Agriculture, 93, 96, 240-242.
Alfred Charles True, A History of Agricultural Extension Work in the United States, 1785-1923
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 5; Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion, 191.

36

18

In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, tree stumps and boulders were one of the
most common challenges that farmers faced in their pursuits of bountiful harvests. According to
the agricultural census of 1870s, unimproved woodland comprised 159,310,177 of the nation’s
407, 735,041 total acres of farmland.37 With nearly forty percent of the United States’ farms
being unimproved woodlands, it was a commonly held belief that there was “no greater obstacle
to farm operations” than stump and rocks.38 Stumps and boulders posed a variety of challenges
for farmers. They occupied valuable real estate that could otherwise be put under the plow, and
the removal of these woodland obstructions was costly and labor intensive. Some farmers
attempted to remove the stumps and rocks with shovels and axes, but many farmers could not
afford to invest the time and labor. For farmers with working livestock or a mechanical stump
puller that twisted their stumps and dislodged their boulders, the issue of chopping up the stump
and crushing the rocks into manageable pieces for removal still remained. When faced with large
stumps and stones, these methods often proved fruitless. It was not uncommon for removal to
take well over half a day to complete. In many cases, the task proved so labor intensive and
expensive that farmers let the stumps rot before investing in their removal and simply left the
boulders in place. 39 But as popular praise for dynamite’s utility in other industries flourished in
the 1870s, farmers began to reimagine the ways in which this high explosive could be used to
rationalize the rocky woodlands landscapes that were their farms.
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In addition to domestic industrial progress, land clearing operations in Great Britain also
prompted the reapplication of dynamite. In 1874, the Glasgow Canadian Land and Trust
Company conducted experiments on the property of Sir W. S. Maxwell in Glasgow, Scotland,
exploring dynamite’s merits in land reclamation. Mr. John Scott, manager of the company, tested
“the utility of the material [dynamite] for land reclamation in Canada” pitting dynamite against
entrenched stumps and whinstone boulders. Dynamite emerged victorious, prompting new
optimism for Scott who felt confident that “he could use the new blasting agent with great effect
and economy in land-clearing operation.”40 Though the arbiters of this experiment had their eyes
set on the Canadian wilderness, their study reached American newspapers such as the New York
Times, Scientific American, and Galaxy.
In October 1875, a contributor to the popular religious publication the Christian Union,
reported on successful land clearing efforts in Ireland explaining, “We have seen dynamite used
with perfect success in blowing stumps to pieces preparatory to the final clearing of forestland.”41 A New York based publication known as The Friend also discussed these early
European experiments in August 1876, highlighting the demonstrations of Robert McArthur and
J. C. Aitken of the British Dynamite Company. Like John Scott, they were interested in
dynamite’s land clearing capabilities. McArthur and Aitken showed the “rapidity with which tree
stumps and stones could be cleared from land.”42 Dynamite furnished fruitful results. As one
contributor to the American Agriculturalist broadcast in 1876, “Dynamite or giant powder has
been extensively used in clearing land of stumps and stones in England and Scotland, and it is
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more effective than common powder. It will doubtless be found useful here for the same
purpose.”43
These events inspired American farmers to try it for themselves. The following year the
American Agriculturalist received a “large number of quarries” from farmers interested in further
information about dynamite’s land clearing capabilities. Eager to oblige, officials at the
publication cooperated with the Atlantic Giant Powder Company to further explore dynamites
uses as a stump and rock remover on American farms.44 Though the manufacturer of the
explosives and media officials conducted this early experiment, the requests of farmers, intrigued
by dynamites potential, fueled this reinvention of dynamite as a tool for agricultural land
improvement.
With the aid of the media, these isolated incidents of reinvention translated into the wide
reception of dynamite as a stump and rock remover in the late nineteenth century. Ex-sheriff and
farmer John T. Pressly, used dynamite to remove “40 huge stumps” from 40 acres of his Indiana
farm in 1881. According to the media reports, dynamite was “entirely satisfactory, and every
stump was blown to atoms.” In 1887, John Hill of Logansport, Indiana hired 23-year-old Henry
Pletecher to blast the stumps on his farm. Unfortunately for Henry, an accidental explosion cost
him his life. In 1899, A. M. Goodman of Rochester, New York secured dynamite for the removal
of stumps on his farm, but before he completed the task, an accidental explosion, allegedly
caused by “mice endeavoring to eat the explosive,” leveled his new farmhouse. These accidents
fostered new fear and anxiety that hampered dynamite’s agricultural proliferation. As farmers
gradually engaged in the practice, the perils of handing explosives became evidently clear.
Despite the danger, many farmers continued to utilize the explosive farm tool.
43
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In 1899, Albert Bellwood recounted his experiences removing stumps for the Southern Planter.
Bellwood explained that “dynamite can be employed to great advantage in disposing of large
stumps.” He detailed the steps necessary to place a charge of dynamite under a stump and to
properly set the blasting cap and fuse. Bellwood exclaimed, “there is no good reason why a
farmer should lose the land [the stump] occupies and plow and run his machinery around it for
twenty or thirty years.”45 Albert Bellwood conveyed dynamite’s utility in the broader processes
of farm mechanization explaining the limits that stumped land placed on farmers’ mechanical
implements such as the plow. Dynamite allowed ordinary farmers to further mechanize their
farms, and the widespread media coverage of their actions further promoted dynamite
agriculture.
By the late 1880s, farmers’ institutes began taking a more active role in spreading
information of dynamite’s new applications as well. In a lecture titled “Origins of the Pine Stump
Farm,” presented February 8, 1889 in Big Rapids, Michigan, W.M. Ladner discussed the reality
of farming in cutover regions of the north. Following the lecture, rigorous debate ensued as
Ladner and lecture attendees argued the merits and limitations of dynamite as an affordable and
effective stump remover. These discussions were not limited to the northern states. On a rainy
Missouri Monday in 1891, Otho McCrackin, Will Sims, and T. W. Herring of the Callaway
Country Farmers’ Institute organized a demonstration of dynamite’s capabilities as a stump and
rock remover in wet conditions. According to the Institute’s report, “The test was highly
gratifying” with 13 of the 16 charges of dynamite exploded being “entirely satisfactory.”46 In the
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early decades of dynamite agricultural, institutes primarily reported the efforts of outside
individuals, but by the late 1880s, institutes became actively involved in generating new
experiments and information about the advantages of using dynamite on the farm as well.
To a limited extent, state boards of agriculture also aided in the dissemination of
information. In 1878, the Connecticut State Board of Agriculture’s reported on dynamite stump
and rock removal in Litchfield, Connecticut where local farmer, Mr. Starr, welcomed Mr.
Parmelee, an independent blaster, onto his farm to remove boulders. Having no prior experiences
with the explosive, Starr invited Parmelee to demonstrate his craft on a field he intended to clear.
Mesmerized by the results, he hired Parmelee to continue his work for two and a half days. Mr.
Starr explained that “the same number of men…could not have accomplished in a month what he
accomplished in two days and a half.”47 Parmelee demonstrated dynamite agriculture’s economy
in cost and time, impressing the Connecticut agricultural board. As early as 1867 the Connecticut
State Board of Agriculture actively promoted extension work, organized lectures, and distributed
informational literature with stories like Starr’s.48 These materials catalyzed new progressive
farming techniques like dynamite land clearing. Though these organizations were not yet
engaged in experimentation, they indirectly served as a conduit through which information
reached farmers across the country.
For most of the nineteenth century, ordinary farmers were responsible for the reinvention
of dynamite as a viable farm tool in America. Primarily applied in stump and rock removal,
dynamite was a means through which many rural individuals actively addressed and creatively
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sought solutions the many problems they faced in the agricultural spheres of the postbellum
United States. The ways in which farmers used dynamite to rationalize landscapes in their
attempts to decreased inputs of time, labor, and money reveals the degree to which financial
troubles motivated many rural Americans to redefine farm labor. In many ways, the efforts of
these individuals catalyzed the further development of explosive agriculture as state and federal
governments became increasingly interested in the professionalization of scientific agriculture in
the closing decades of the century.
Developing the Agricultural Sciences, 1887-1900
The passage of the Hatch Act in 1887 marked a distinct shift in the establishment of the
agricultural sciences. By 1886, private entrepreneurs and land grant colleges had furnished
experiment stations in twelve states. In the nation’s capital, members of Congress discussed
efforts to secure federal funding for these experiment stations as early as 1883, but it was not
until March 2, 1887, when President Cleveland signed the Hatch Act into law that the federal
government allotted funds for the purposes of scientific experimentation in agriculture. This act
“provided $15,000 a year from the sales of public lands, to be given to each state and territory for
experiment station work.”49 Connected to the land grant colleges, these experiment stations were
the primary testing ground for the agricultural sciences, and despite institutional turmoil,
explored dynamite’s agricultural applications beyond stump and rock removal.
The Hatch Act of 1887 was the result of seventy years of agitation within the agricultural
community for the establishment of formal institutions of education. The impetus for
agricultural education in the nineteenth century began in the 1820s with the organization of local
agricultural societies. These local organization eventually associated to form state-level orders
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that joined forces in 1852 to establish the United States Agricultural Society. These organizations
lobbied the federal and state governments to create institutions of agricultural learning. Amidst
the chaos of the Civil War, Congress answered with the Morrill Act, which established
agricultural colleges across the country. While the act successfully created new institutions,
efforts to educative rural Americans in best farming practices were dismal. The state of
agriculture was so poor that in 1875 Congress formally authorized the United States Military to
distribute 2,000,000 rations to over 100,000 farmers in Minnesota, the Dakota territory,
Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, and Colorado.50 The primary reason for the bleak performance was the
lack of foundational knowledge. Prior to 1862, agricultural science had not existed as a
discipline in the U.S., and as a result, there was neither the structured curriculum or qualified
instructors required to address the needs of farmers. Between 1862 and 1887, the agricultural
colleges had little effect on the state of agriculture.51
The Hatch Act was of vital importance to the establishment of the agricultural sciences,
but internal struggles in the early years of the experiment stations’ existence hindered research
efforts. Classical chemists, the old guard of agricultural education, argued for curriculum
grounded in the principles of agricultural chemistry based on the studies of German scientist
Justus Liebig. But by the time Congress passed the Hatch Act in 1887, new progressive minded
agriculturalists were pushing for scientific research and exploration in practical agricultural
practices. This included proper plowing techniques, mechanization, and even genetics. These
differing visions of agricultural education gridlocked research efforts at the colleges and
experiment stations for nearly a decade. Despite the conflict, forty-six experiment stations had
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issued a total of “45 reports and 237 bulletins” containing information on best practices in
agriculture by 1893.52
Through the end of the nineteenth century, work at the experiment stations, especially
when it came to exploration of chemical high explosives, was to a large degree reactionary. As
experiment station researchers worked to establish a knowledge base for the agricultural
sciences, a select few stations overcame the internal conflicts to address the troubles of their
constituents. The 1894 report of the Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of
California explained that the organization was “designed for the benefit of the agricultural
public,” which was reflected in the organization’s soil examination programs that inspected soil
samples sent in by ordinary farmers and published the results of the finding in annual reports.53
The ingenuity of individuals inspired further experimentation in the agricultural sciences, but to a
large degree, the stations minimally studied dynamite in the nineteenth century. Instead, the
experiment stations developed the base of scientific research required for the broader
development of the agricultural sciences. In the limited extent it was studied, dynamite, as a tool
for the farm, took on new meaning as station employees tested chemical high explosive’s
capabilities in new scientific studies beyond land clearing.
In 1897, the agricultural experiment station in Oregon explored the merits of subsoiling
and its relationship to drainage in one of the first instances where an experiment station directly
studied the uses of chemical high explosives. “Subsoiling” the annual report explained, was
“intimately connected with drainage” because the purpose of subsoiling was to loosen
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undesirable compact subsoils that would otherwise be impervious to water. This was important
because soil composition determines moisture content, and moisture content was one of the most
important factors in determining crop yield. The experiment station researchers discovered that
some farmers in the eastern part of the state had used dynamite “as a means of breaking the hardpan so that water can drain through” their soil. The scientists found the practice to be fruitful in
areas with compact soils but explained that “open porous subsoil cannot be benefitted by having
the soil made more open.”54 Addressing the variability of soil types that existed across the state,
the Oregon scientists acknowledged that individual farms often have a variety of different soils.
They found that what might be considered best practice in agriculture on one person’s farm
could be detrimental to another individual’s work. They engaged both in the development of
foundational agricultural knowledge and showed how individual reinventions of dynamite
became interwoven in this process.
In this period, the agricultural experiment stations also further explored dynamite’s
application in stump and rock removal. While this method received much praise in the 1870s and
1880s, a lack of scientific experimentation in the practice prompted many farmers to question the
virtues of this practice. Into the twentieth century this lack of scientific understanding still
prompted inquiries. In 1902, K. B. Fort wrote to the Southern Cultivator asking about the cost of
removing pine stumps with dynamite. Two years later, J. M. Herring of Calvary, Georgia further
inquired about the price of dynamite and the best means of employing it in the removal of tree
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stumps. Even as late as 1906, the publication received queries about the merits of dynamite and
stump pullers with a particular interest in cost-efficient applications.55
As a result, experiment stations across the country blasted stumps with a scientific rigor
not seen among the applications of decades past. The Washington State Agricultural College
Experiment Station’s exploration of stump blasting in the state’s upland soils showed this new
scientific meticulousness. Where instructions on stump blasting lacked specific direction in most
of the nineteenth-century accounts, the 1897 report from Washington explained, “the manner in
which a blast is placed determines its efficiency” going into great detail about the proper
placement of dynamite in stump blasting operations. Blasting 221 stumps across four and a
quarter acres, the work of the Washington scientists also utilized a sample size far greater than
most of the independent experiments reported before 1887. The experiment showed that on
average, it cost 77 cents to remove a stump. Though no comparative analysis between blasting
and other methods was conducted, the arbiters of the experiment proclaimed dynamite “the most
practicable means of getting out sound stumps.”56
While the experiment stations developed the agricultural sciences, the information
generated there inspired individuals and private farmers’ associations to further reinvent
dynamite. In 1889, a Pennsylvania farmer named J. H. Hale planted a home orchard on the
“rocky timbered lot” that was his property. Employing the “best grade of dynamite,” Hale found
that it would cost him $200 an acre to clear his poor land, a proposition he initially thought was
far too expensive. But “on account of the stones or stumps where trees ought to go,” Hale
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decided to employ dynamite when it came to planting one section of his property. On the other
section, Hale plowed the ground with a traditional spring tooth harrow and explained that he
drove “a little in one direction, and then in another way, and every way that [he] could get
between the stumps and the stones.” As he stated, “It takes about two years to do any plowing
equal to one plowing on ordinary farm land.”57 Hale engaged in new explosive farming
techniques to tackle the issues of time and labor. In using the blasted holes to plant a new
orchard, Hale was also engaged in the process of reinvention as he creatively employed dynamite
both as a stump remover and a means of planting his orchard.
Discussion of individual successes with dynamite agriculture prompted individuals,
private organizations, and college experiment stations to further adopt the practice. Both Our
Horticultural Visitor, an Illinois based publication targeting the orchard growers and cultivators
of ornamental plants, and the Missouri State Horticultural Society discussed a resourceful Illinois
farmer’s successful application of dynamite in planting his apple orchard. In his existing orchard,
which contained “several varieties [of apples] that would not pay for the use of the ground they
occupied,” the farmer employed dynamite in the removal of the unproductive trees. This proved
useful not only in the clearing of land but because the dynamite “made a hole that it took a half
load of fresh dirt to fill up,” the property owner planted the new trees in the blasted holes.
Impressed by the results, Our Horticultural Visitor advocated, “there need be no fear of
replanting an old orchard with young trees, if they used dynamite to removal the old stumps;
provided that they fed and cultivated the young trees as they ought to be.” 58 With dynamite, the
farmer revitalized his orchard.
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Between 1887 and 1900 experiment stations and the agricultural sciences took root and
flourished. While exploration of dynamite’s merits in applications new and old occurred, it was
the not the primary concern for the majority of the experiment stations that worked through
internal disagreements and established the foundational agricultural sciences and curriculums.
The unorthodox practice that was explosive farming only occasionally meshed with these efforts.
But at the turn of the twentieth century this changed dramatically as the United States further
invested in agricultural research and education, and as the explosives industry experienced a
major restructuring that significantly affected the agricultural explosives market.
Experimentation, 1900-1914
By 1900, a new order of leaders took control of the experiment stations. Taking a keen
interest in the needs of their constituents, these individuals restructured their respective
experiment station’s research agendas. While William H. Henry of Wisconsin, Eugene
Davenport of Illinois, and Eugene W. Hilgard of California spearheaded this movement, they
were not alone in their efforts. The 1903 annual report of the North Dakota experiment station
highlighted its extensive support and cooperation with farmers’ institutes. Cooperation with
institutes, which were privately organized, shows the level of concern that experiment stations
took in the plight of their constituent farmers. They also focused on more specific concerns that
emanated from the state’s newly settled regions. In the “immense area of the state lying west of
the Red River Valley” the report explained, “the soil and agricultural conditions of this vast
territory, now occupied by small farm holdings, differs so radically from the soil and agricultural
condition of the Red River Valley…that a line of experiments should be begun at the earliest
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moment to meet these concerns.”59 Overcoming the tumult of internal conflict, the experiment
stations of the twentieth century greatly expanded practical research efforts.
By 1906, the federal government further directed the efforts of the experiment stations
toward the needs of local farmers. On March 16, 1906, Congress passed the Adams Act which
“increased annual appropriations for agricultural experiment stations and regulating the
expenditure thereof.” According to the United States Office of Experiment Stations:
The policy of the Office as heretofore, is to endeavor to formulate and hold to such
general principles in the administration of the Adams Act as seen most likely to secure
the efficient use of the Adams fund for research work of a high and substantial character
and at the same time to safeguard the autonomy of the stations and raise their work and
its results in the estimation of their farmer constituents.
Further, federal officials called for “much additional correspondence and personal conference”
between farmers and their respective experiment stations to guide the experiment station
researchers’ work.60 This focus allowed for a collaborative relationship between the government
and individuals to flourish, a relationship that fostered further reapplication of dynamite.
As early-twentieth-century experiment station workers addressed the concerns of farmers
across the country, ordinary farmers’ interest in chemical high explosives as farm implements
soon prompted new scientific experimentation of dynamite agriculture. By 1911, the Kentucky
Agricultural Experiment Station explored further the use of dynamite in stump removal
operations. George Roberts, head of the Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station’s Division of
Agronomy, encapsulated the struggle of many Southern and Midwestern farmers who toiled on
previously wooded lands in the station’s 154th bulletin. In his telling, cost-benefit analysis of
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stump removal with dynamite had not been calculated as of June 1911, but the long-term benefits
of this practice made stump removal a worthwhile venture. The biggest limitation of farming
stumped fields was that it prevented “a proper rotation of crops.”61 Roberts explained that it was
common practice for “a field in the stumps” to be planted with a “cultivated crop, generally corn,
until the stumps have rotted down” making removal much easier; for stumps that were 10 inches
or smaller this was understood to take about eight years.62 This practice, effective in the short
run, hampered the field’s ability to produce steady and profitable harvest. In the extended period
of time in which the stumps were left to rot, the field remained un-rotated, which depleted the
soil of the essential nutrients required for continued production.63 In some instances, farmers
attempted to rotate stumped fields planting either straw or grain crops. Still the stumps proved to
be a significant barrier to production because the efficacy of seeding machines and harvesters
commonly used in grain and straw farming was severely diminished, as there was often a “large
loss of space around the stumps.”64 The most effective way to overcome these woodland
obstacles was dynamite.
Researchers at the Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station examined dynamite’s
effectiveness as a stump remover in two separate experiments in the spring of 1911. In both
instances it proved an effective and affordable mechanical implementation and labor-saving
device. In the first experiment carried out on a farm in London, Kentucky, dynamite removed a
total of 102 trees stumps with an average diameter of 16 inches. Stumps removed were primarily
dead oak, but a small percentage of green oak, dead pine, green black gum, green sugar maple,

61

Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station. Bulletin No. 154: Blowing Stumps with Dynamite (June
1911), 19.
62
Ibid., 24.
63
Ibid., 19.
64
Ibid., 20.

32

and green gum stumps were also removed in the test. The researchers used a total of 265 sticks
of dynamite, or 2.6 per stump. The average cost of material per stump was 25.7 cents or a total of
$26.20 for the entire field. A single worker completed the task in five days averaging 30 minutes
per stump. At a cost of $1.50 per day for labor, it cost a total of $33.70 or 33 cents per stump to
remove the 102 specimens.65
The second experiment conducted under the authority of the experiment station on its
farm in Lexington, Kentucky, tested dynamite against a much smaller sample size of 16 trees.
Nine of the stumps were green, and the tree varieties were hackberry, elm, walnut, cherry, maple,
osage orange, and oak. Three of the green oak stumps included in the test were of exceptional
size measuring 43, 45, and 48 inches in diameter. Compared to other tests reported in experiment
station records, these stumps appear to be an anomaly. While unique, this experiment yielded
interesting results. Researchers discovered that the removal of green stumps required a
significantly larger quantity of dynamite than dead stumps. For the nine tested, workers recorded
an average diameter of 22 inches, and it required a total of 93 sticks of dynamite to remove them.
The cost of supplies and labor was $14.06. The three large oaks accounted for $10.55 of the total
costs. Researchers concluded that the largest factor in determining the amount of dynamite
required to remove a stump was the square of the “area of the cross section of a stump.” Despite
the increased cost, those who conducted the experiment also concluded that there was “no other
method by which they could be removed so cheaply,” and in assessment of the two tests stated,
“One point seems clear, and that is, that when stumps are to be removed, the cheapest methods is
by the use of dynamite.”66
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Figure 1: Kansas experiment station worker using an auger to create a hole
under a stump to be removed with dynamite, circa 1911.

Figure 3: Picture of dynamite explosion used to
remove a tree stump, circa 1911.

Figure 2: Stump to be blown out with dynamite,
circa 1911.

Superintendent of the Minnesota experiment station, A. J. McGuire, was arguably the
most devout supporter of dynamite agriculture in this period of experiment station work.
McGuire had a vision of transforming the vast cutover regions of Northern Minnesota, an area
encompassing nearly a quarter of the state’s landmass, into “clover fields and cow pastures.”
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Explaining that “the possibilities of its agriculture are no longer experimental,” McGuire stated,
“The only practicable means of getting rid of the stumps is by the horse powered stump puller
and explosives…the machine is used for the smaller stumps while explosives are used on the
larger ones.” According to the station report, dynamite is “best for blasting” and cost including
labor would not exceed $25 per acre. This was according to the results of a recent experiment
station study that cleared 8.7 acres of land at a cost of $205.68.67
Among the ranks of the experiment station, the early years of the twentieth century
brought a newfound focus on the development of agricultural science with an emphasis on
addressing the needs of farmers across the country. In some instances, this brought the
developments of dynamite agriculture to the attention of the researchers who further explored
dynamite’s merits in stump and rock removal and to a limited degree, tree planting, plowing, and
subsoiling. But a third player, chemical manufacturers, took notice of these explosive
developments as well, and became a new and powerful force that shaped the ways in which
Americans used and understood dynamite as a progressive farm implement.
A series of developments in the first two decades of the twentieth century diverted part of
the chemical manufacturers’ focus from the construction and mining industries. In addition to
having a myopic marketing strategy in the nineteenth century, producers of explosives began
consolidating the high explosives industry as early as 1881 when the Du Pont and Laflin Rand
owned Repauno Chemical Company started purchasing stock in smaller dynamite firms. This
included California Powder Works that Repauno renamed Hercules Powder Company in 1881.
By 1902, Du Pont president Coleman Du Pont purchased Laflin & Rand giving his company a
minority interest in a majority of the nation’s dynamite firms as part of a larger effort to unite the
67
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dynamite and explosives industry under the sole name of Du Pont Powder Company. As a result,
Du Pont was the primary supplier of dynamite and other chemical high explosives until 1912.68
Being the primary producer of dynamite for the first 12 years of the twentieth century, Du
Pont directly targeted the agricultural market with informational pamphlets about dynamite’s
utility in agriculture as early as 1909. A decline in black powder sales prompted the shift, but by
1913, a 10 percent drop in dynamite sales to the construction and mining industries further
inspired the move. In 1911, farmers were introduced to New Farms For Old Through Deep
Plowing With Du Pont Red Cross Low Freezing Dynamite. This book was the first of many Du
Pont mailers that specifically highlighted the uses of dynamite in agriculture. Additionally, this
was the first publication that marketed Du Pont’s new Red Cross brand dynamite. In a section
titled “Why We Recommend Red Cross Dynamite For Farm-work” the pamphlet explained:
Red Cross Dynamite is better suited for most of the blasting necessary about the farm,
than any other explosive. Our many years of experience in the manufacture and use of
explosive, has taught us that if an explosive is to do its work at the lowest possible cost
and produce the best results, it must be made with qualities especially suited to the work
in which it is to be used. Red Cross Dynamite is particularly strong in those qualities
necessary in agricultural blasting.69
This was the first time that a manufacturer of explosives produced and marketed a formulation of
dynamite specifically for agricultural needs.
By 1912, Du Pont had manufactured a whole line of agricultural explosives. Informing
readers that “there are many different kinds of high explosives manufactured for the various
blasting operations,” the 1912 Du Pont Farmers’ Handbook showed the merits of their entire
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line of agricultural implements.70 This included Du Pont standard Red Cross Dynamite, which
was touted for its “sensitiveness, stability, or power of keeping, and resistance to cold and water”
and its virtues of “strength, or disruptive power, and quickness, or shattering power.”71 Other
high explosives advertised included Red Cross Farm Powder, Red Cross Extra 20 to 60 Per Cent
dynamite, Pacific Stumping Powder, and Du Pont Gelatin among others. All of these explosives
were specifically designed to overcome environmental limitations to agricultural development.
The Pacific Stumping powder, for example, was “especially adapted to stump blasting in the
Pacific Northwest and sold only in that district.” Red Cross Farm Powder, “a slow acting, low
freezing powder” was specific designed for “subsoil blasting, tree planting, gully filling,
loosening soils for road grading, and stump and boulder blasting on heavy soils” where the more
rapid explosion of standard Red Cross Dynamite was not needed. When faced with particularly
cold and wet conditions, Farmers’ Handbook recommended Du Pont Gelatin for its “plastic”
nature that allowed a greater degree of cold tolerance and water resistance when compared to
other Du Pont brand high explosives.72 By creating farm specific formulations of dynamite, Du
Pont engaged in the literal reinvention of high explosives as a tool for the farm that redirected
marketing efforts, catalyzed new experimentation, and increased the use of dynamite among the
population.
Addressing the concerns of farmers across the country, Du Pont’s informational literature
engaged in the reinvention of dynamite and cultivated new consumers of agricultural explosives.
New Farms For Old placed dynamite in conversation with subsoiling explaining, “The value of
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dynamite in the orchard has been proved beyond question,” the booklet portrayed dynamite as
universally effective in these efforts.73 Emphasizing the destructive elements of the Red-Cross
Dynamite, the booklet showed how dynamite effectively “breaks up the hardpan and permits the
roots to take their downward course into the lower strata of the soil in which plenty of plant food
elements are available. Under these conditions one tree is not interfered with by another; each
one receives the benefits of all of the soil allotted to it at the time the surface was measured and
aid out at planting time.”74
Reacting to experiment station researchers’ interest in subsoiling, this publication offered
numerous anecdotal examples to show dynamite’s efficacy in the pratice. The Commissioner of
the New York State Fair wrote to Du Pont to say, “Sub-Soiling work [with dynamite] has proven
a great success” in the fairground’s oat fields (See figures 4 and 5). W. C. Maxwell, a farmer and
landowner from Derrick City, Pennsylvania, use dynamite to subsoil for buckwheat on
previously worthless ground. After blasting his ground and witnessing a superb harvest, Maxwell
valued an acre of his land at “fifty dollars, which was formerly worthless.” The claim being
made was simple. Subsoiling with dynamite transformed poor ground into productive
farmland.75 W. R. Cobb of the Steward Oconee County Poor Farm in Walhalla, South Carolina
reportedly doubled his normal harvest of cotton when he decided to subsoil a field with dynamite
before sowing cottonseeds.76 This pamphlet not only showed evidence of dynamite’s use beyond
the boundaries of the experiment stations, but also addressed other concerns that many farmers
had.
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Figure 5

Figure 4

Even though experiment stations and chemical manufacturers keenly addressed the
problems facing farmers in the early twentieth century, the state of American agriculture had
never been better. Farm prices grew steadily between 1897 and 1910, which ushered in the high
and stable prices of the “Golden age of American Agriculture” that lasted from 1910 to 1914.
With farm prices high and stable, chemical manufacturers began to capitalize on the cash rich
agricultural market.77 While farmers still faced many challenges to productive harvests, times
were good, which prompted farmers to explore new techniques like dynamite agriculture as they
hoped to take full advanced of the favorable economic forecast.
Du Pont’s tendency to portray dynamite as a universally effective farm implement
prompted additional reactions from experiment stations. From 1911 to 1916, the agricultural
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experiment station in Manhattan, Kansas studied the effects of dynamite on soil composition and
plant growth. Bulletin 209 of the Kansas State Agricultural College reported,
Within the last four or five years several firms manufacturing dynamite have advocated
its use for the purpose of loosening the subsoils of cultivated fields to a greater depth than
it is possible to loosen them by means of the common subsoil plow or other deep tillage
implements. It has been asserted that almost any type of soil can be improved in physical
condition…It was for the purpose of obtaining definite information as to the value of
dynamite for soil improvement that experimental work was started at this station.
On the farm of J. E. Thompson in Fredonia, Kansas, researchers tested the effects of dynamite on
sorghum growth in Oswego Silt Loam soil. This was characterized as “mellow, dark gray silt
loam to a depth of twelve inches” with a thirty-inch subsoil comprised of “dark-brown to drab
silty clay which is very tough and plastic when wet.” Noting that the blasting was conducted
while the soil was “very wet,” the scientist reported that “the effect of the charge was to form a
cavity about eight inches in diameter, the walls of which were puddled and compacted very hard.
Despite the unintended soil compaction, the harvest of sorghums from the dynamited field was
empirically the same as the harvest from an undynamited control field.78
A similar experiment in Agra, Kansas fostered different results. Conducted in similar soil
conditions, the wheat harvest from a field treated with dynamite was 2.1 bushels per acre less
than the first control field and 5.2 bushels per acre below the yield of a second control plot.
Nearly every test of blasting in heavy clay soils showed that it had a tendency to create a hallow
cavity referred to as a “dynamite jug” (see figure 6).79 These results served as a check against the
ostentatious advertisement of chemical manufacturers, but they also reveal the ways in which
discussion of dynamite agriculture prompted research and furthered the development of
agricultural science.
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Figure 6

Describing the versatility of Red Cross Dynamite in cold weather, its safety and stability,
its affordability, and the availability of various concentrations, Du Pont’s advertisements
straddled a line between marketing and education. The primary educational component was
safety. While information on applications appeared exaggerated, Du Pont’s safety materials were
not. Du Pont and other manufacturers addressed safety because consumers in the budding
agricultural market expressed reservations about the dangers of handling dynamite.
Even if an individual farmer had not experienced first-hand the risks of handling
chemical high explosives, extensive media reports of dynamite related accidents on the farm
uncovered the potential perils of dynamite’s explosive energies to farmers across the country. In
1878, the Chicago Tribune described in graphic detail an accidental explosion that killed four
men, Andy P. Higgins, J. P. Burkholder, N. B. Pulver, and Charles S. Page who were present on
the Curtis Farm in Oil City, Pennsylvania when “twenty pounds of glycerine [sic] and seventyfive pounds of dynamite” exploded. “Fragments of flesh and shreds of clothing were strewn over
the ground” between 50 and 100 feet from the explosion. This was not a singular event. In
September of 1882, the Tribune reported that a dynamite explosion killed an Indiana farmer
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named William Henry and badly injured his son while they were on their way to blast stumps. A
spark from a torch had ignited the explosives. Those doing the blasting were not the only ones
whose lives were in danger. A Minnesota farmer named James Hunter attempted to thaw
dynamite intended for stump blasting in his oven. Forgetting about the dynamite, Hunter went
into town and the dynamite exploded killing his wife and two children.80
While safety concerns threatened dynamite’s proliferation on the farm, other
developments also fostered reluctance. The second most important barrier was political
radicalism. In a sense, political radicals’ use of chemical high explosives was not dissimilar to
that of farmers. Irish nationalist, anarchists, and radical labor groups also channeled their
dissatisfactions into creative reinventions of dynamite. Leveraging dynamite as a tool for
political independence, agitation, and as a means of achieving social and economic reform, these
groups attacked their opposition with dynamite and other improvised explosives.81 But these
applications did much more than damage property and dismember those they understood as
oppressors. Dynamite outrages, as they were often referred to, had much broader cultural
ramifications that shaped popular conceptions. For many, dynamite became inextricably linked
to radicalism and entangled in anti-immigrant sentiments that circulated the streets of nineteenthand early twentieth-century America often prompting new and restrictive regulations of
explosives in cities and states across the country.82 While it is impossible to measure the degree
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to which this played into farmers’ purchasing habits, the wide spread hysteria recorded in
newspapers suggests that political radicalism may not have informed farmers’ opinions on
dynamite as a legitimate farm tool. Additionally, these outrages prompted local and state level
regulations that measurably barred farmers’ access to explosives.83
While radicalism and accidents fostered a culture of fear and anxiety that hampered
dynamite’s agricultural applications, it also formed the basis upon which Du Pont engaged in
educational work. Du Pont literature tended to segment discussion of safety concerns into the
categories of hauling, handling, storing, unpacking, and thawing dynamite giving special
attention to directions on thawing. “The best way to thaw dynamite…is in a thawing kettle made
for the purpose” explained the authors of the 1912 Du Pont Farmers’ Handbook, who were
addressing the fact that “a large majority of the accidents which happen when dynamite is used,
occur in thawing.” Further, the authors of the Du Pont literature addressed “bomb throwing by
anarchists.” Events like the 1886 Chicago Haymarket Affair in which anarchists allegedly hurled
a dynamite bomb into a crowd of police officers crystalized the association between dynamite
and political radicalism that was detrimental to Du Pont’s business. Attempting to cast dynamite
in a new light, they argued that newspapers “incorrectly report[ed]” such events. In addressing
“popular misconceptions of dynamite in the public mind,” the marketing directors at Du Pont
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were at once reinventing dynamite as a tool for the farm and engaging in an education campaign
that challenged popular perceptions of dynamite.84
Just as Du Pont was breaking into the agricultural market, the federal government
fundamentally restructured the explosive industry. Du Pont’s consolidation of the high explosive
industry in 1902 essentially created a monopoly on explosives, but shortly after, the federal
government sued Du Pont for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1907. The suit divided the
company into the E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Company, Hercules Powder Company, and
Atlas Powder Company in 1912 with Du Pont retaining “58 percent of its capacity to make
dynamite.” As for the other two companies, it was ordered that the larger, which would become
Hercules, be twice as big as the smaller, which would become Atlas. These three new companies
subsequently diversified their interests in the broader explosives market, but because the
majority of the assets went to both Du Pont and Hercules, they became the two major players in
the budding agricultural explosives market.85
An Explosive for the Homefront, 1914-1920
Just two years after the explosives industry found itself at odds with the federal
government, the outbreak of World War I created a climate in which the two adversaries found
common ground. This alliance took shape in pursuit of productive farmland. The increased
pressure placed on farmers to intensify crop production in response to the global demand for
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food prompted manufacturers of explosives to further invest in agriculture-specific explosives
while the federal government was interested in studying and promoting best practices for
farming and encouraging farmers to put every acre of tillable land into production.
World War I drastically affected the degree to which experiment station employees
researched, and chemical high explosive manufactures promoted dynamite agriculture. The U.S.
Office of Experiment Stations expressed in its July 1918 report that one result of extended global
combat was “to demonstrate anew the value of generous and systematic provisions for the
encouragement of agricultural research.” This opinion was more than just blind speculations as
the funds allotted for experiment station work amounted to $5,642,149.16 in 1917 where in
1910, the total funding amounted to $3,537,700.25. This increased funding translated into
additional research and outreach efforts. In 1910 the experiment stations collectively published
“583 annual reports, bulletins and circulars, which were supplied to over 952,000 addresses. By
1917 the amount of published literature expanded threefold to “1,624 annual reports, bulletins,
and circulars, aggregating 28,109 pages, and these were distributed to 1,130,219 addresses.” In
the private sector, Du Pont continued its advertisement efforts while the newly organized
Hercules Powder Company distributed literature of its own and sent company sales
representatives to cooperate with agricultural colleges giving lectures and demonstrations.86
World War I also ushered in a new set of conditions that greatly affected the role
dynamite played on the American farm. Increased export demand, the subsequent rise in farm
prices that accompanied it, and the increased demand for farmland prompted farmers to intensify
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production and further mechanize their farms. By the time World War I erupted in Europe,
American farmers had placed the majority of the nation’s easily adaptable farmland into
production. Wartime demand for foodstuffs caused farm prices to more than double between
1916 and 1920 and this led to bidding wars for farmland as prices rose by “70 percent between
1913 and 1920.”87 Also, at least by the time the U.S. entered combat, the war drew on the
nation’s labor supply, which when combined with the effects of urbanization, left many farmers
shorthanded.
For manufacturers of explosives this meant a new opportunity to further promote the
agricultural benefits of blasting. Hercules, for example, mailed out free pamphlets such as
Progressive Cultivation and Farm Dynamite, which described new methods of explosive
farming. In fact, the agricultural market was the only area that Hercules saw continually growth
in immediately following the war’s end.88
For the federal government, this meant a heightened urgency to boost agricultural
production. This manifested in the increased funding for agricultural research and education
through the passage of the 1914 Smith-Lever Act. The passage of the Smith-Lever Act in 1914
greatly expanded the Agricultural Experiment Stations’ spheres of influence by bringing into
cooperation the federally funded county extension programs, operating in 928 counties at this
time and the work of state level experiment stations. The Act furnished $10,000 for states that
cooperated with the terms of the law and offered additional funds based on the rural populations
of the state, provided that the state matched the funding. As a result, subsidies for agricultural
extension nearly doubled between 1915 and 1917 to a total of $6.1 million with 4100 agricultural
agents working across 1434 counties. This transformed the county agents into federally funded
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“off-campus instructors of the colleges of agriculture,” and they served as the “principle conduit
through which scientific knowledge and technological advances were transmitted to farmers
from the state colleges of agriculture.”89 This included information on how to most effectively
deploy chemical high explosives to meet growing demands for food. The Smith-Lever Act
streamlined the flow of information as experiment stations researched new application for
dynamite on the Homefront.
World War I created new opportunities for business and government cooperation. In
1916, the agricultural experiment station in Wisconsin organized a 13-week series of farm
demonstration in collaboration with Du Pont and number of railroads including the Chicago,
Milwaukee and St. Paul and the Chicago and North Western railroads. Making 15 stops in 14
counties, “three experienced operators” from the E. I. du Pont de Nemours Company
demonstrated the efficacy of various concentrations of Du Pont brand dynamite and other
blasting accessories used in stump removal. In 1917, the Wisconsin experiment station made “a
special appropriation of $37,500” for demonstration work in clearing cutover land with stump
pullers and dynamite. Collaborating with a local railroad, the station’s demonstration workers
conducted 30 demonstrations, 16 of which lasted a week long, for more than 8000 residents of
the state’s northern region. These demonstrations successfully prompted the cooperative buying
of stump pullers, and “in many instances…whole communities united in the purchase of
dynamite in car lots.” 90 Educating farmers how to handle explosives, these demonstrations
transferred the expertise of Du Pont’s blasting agents to ordinary farmers. The collaborative
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efforts of business and government increased access to information and translated into reception
of the practice.
Beyond collaborating with experiment station and extension services, manufacturers of
explosives also capitalized on wartime conditions. In 1915, Du Pont introduced Vertical
Farming, a monthly magazine “to acquaint farm owners with the uses of dynamite in farming.”
While du Pont had already published Du Pont Magazine, which focused on a wide variety of du
Pont’s chemical products, Vertical Farming was primarily dedicated to agriculture. The second
issue of Vertical Farming, released in March of 1915, featured President Woodrow Wilson’s
address on the global food shortage and the war. Highlighting the president’ s call to agricultural
action, Du Pont’s marketers urged their readers to “force every acre of cultivated land to
maximum food production and put under cultivation the millions of acres of cut-over and
swampland that now occupy parts of our country just as truly as a hostile force.” The
advertisement also highlighted specific applications urging farmers to “buy cut-over land and
clear it right now. With Red Cross Dynamite, which is low-freezing, you can get stumps out
before the snow is off the ground, and raise a big food crop in 1915 on acres now in stump.”
Furthermore, Du Pont pressured farmers to regain swamplands and irrigate arid ground. By
urging farmers to “blast ditches and drain reclaimable swamp land” and to “eliminate the waste
parts of [their] farm” Du Pont motivated farmers to improve existing farmlands and reclaim
those previously unable to be cultivated.91
In 1918, Du Pont ran a series of advertisements exploiting rural labor shortages. Featured
in a December issue of Progressive Farmer, an ad titled “Does Labor Shortage Worry You?”
engaged the fears and anxieties that plagued many farmers in 1918. The ad touted Du Pont’s line
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of agricultural explosives for their ability to “do the work of many men,” and in an effort to
personify the product, it explained, “Red Cross Farm Powder is a modern miracle worker that
saves time, money, and work.”92 This example is one of many that highlighted chemical high
explosives potential to save farmers’ time, money, and labor. Featured in the March 23, 1918
issue of Literary Digest, was another advertisement titled “Is Your Problem Lack of Labor?”
This promotion positioned Du Pont brand dynamite in conversation with the global food
shortages and labor troubles of the time. “Red Cross Farm Explosives will do more real work for
you in a few hours than ten men could do in a week” the advertisement boasted, and “just now
the whole world needs food…It is very farmers golden opportunity.”93 Advertisements like these
reshaped popular understanding of explosives by casting the product as a tool for increased farm
productivity, and in the contest of the war, many farmers answered their patriotic duty to blast
their farms.
Though Hercules Powder Company did not outwardly address the wartime demands on
agriculture in the same fashion as Du Pont, the same issues appear in its advertisements in a
subtler manner. In 1917, Hercules ran an ad in the Farm, Stock, and Home journal titled “There
are Dollars In Your Subsoil. Get Them Out!” Claiming that subsoiling with dynamite could
increase crop yields from 10 to 200 percent, the advertisement not only addressed the wartime
demand for food, but also revealed the economic motivations that drove many ordinary farmers
to rationalize their farms through mechanization and intensified production. Playing into “high
prices and increased land value” that demanded “the use of every acre” after the conclusion of
the war, another Hercules ad asked, “are you taking advantage of every opportunity to improve
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your farm and make your idle acres pay?” The advertisement stated that “$72.65 for dynamite
and caps” reclaimed “$1000 worth of land” for one progressively minded farmer.94
Experiment stations operated independently as well. In 1917, the experiment station in
Kansas explored the effects of dynamite upon soil conditions and its effects on crop yields,
“moisture content, nitrate development, bacterial flora, and physical conditions of the soil.” Of
all these tests, the only experiment to show a marked improvement over soils not treated with
dynamite was in reference to the number of bacteria in the “surface foot” of soil blasted with
dynamite. Though it was not all negative either, as the only experiment to yield an explicitly
negative effect was the one dealing with dynamiting heavy clay soils for the planting of fruit
trees.95 Regardless of the outcomes, the complexity of exploration illuminated the effect of
wartime demand on the intricacy of scientific research and showed the ways that dynamite’s
newfound place in agriculture aided in this process.
World War I was the ultimate realization of dynamite agriculture that resulted from fifty
years of creative reimagination of dynamite as a tool for the farm. Wartime demands for food
prompted the collaborative efforts of business and government to at once research chemical high
explosive agriculture, educate ordinary farmers on its merits, help dispel popular fears of
dynamite, and further promote its reception. Additionally, food shortages resulted in
skyrocketing farm prices that lined the pockets of newly optimistic farmers. This led to increased
value for farmland, which with the help of business and government, prompted farmers to
actively reclaim every acre of tillable farmland with the help of dynamite. By 1920, there was
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total of 503,073,007 acres of improved farmland in the United States where in 1870, there was
only 188,921,099.96
Conclusion
By the end of World War I, dynamite had become a tool for the farm. From 1867 to
1920, the interplay and exchange between ordinary farmers, chemical manufacturers, and critical
arms of the agricultural state developed and distributed knowledge of dynamite’s utility and
varied applications on American farms. Aided by publicity from the media, farmers’
organizations, government publications, and business advertisement campaigns, this process
transformed dynamite agriculture from a series of isolated reinventions to a significant subset of
the explosives industry. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the practice supported largescale advertisement campaigns, the production of farm specific explosives, and the publication of
application specific periodicals such as Du Pont’s Vertical Farming. By 1919, Du Pont reported
average sales of “15,000,000 pounds of dynamite yearly for farm uses,” between 1914 and 1919,
agriculture was the only market for explosives in which Hercules saw sustained growth in sales,
and by 1924, dynamite sold for agricultural purposes amounted to no less than 20,000,000
pounds annually.97 While it is impossible to track the exact percentage of farmers who adopted
explosive farming practices, the scale of the industry reflects its importance.
Of all the applications explored in this period, the most successful and widely received
use for dynamite on the farm was stump removal. Writing for the Manufacturers Record in
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September 1919, Geo D. Lowe reported that “75 percent of the Wisconsin cutover land that
[went] into cultivation [was] cleared with Dynamite.” A. J. McAdams of the Michigan Farmer
described the practice as “becoming more universal” by 1922. While this was the most common
application, other uses such as tree planting, ditching, and subsoiling prevailed in this period as
well even in spite of experiment station reports that questioned the efficiency of such uses.98 By
1920, dynamite had found its place in American agriculture.
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Chapter II:
Restructuring Landscapes: Explosive Energy and the Rise of Agroecosystems, 1902-1929
“Agriculture never carried so broad a meaning as at this present time” exclaimed Alvah
Hayward Pulver, special contributor to Vertical Farming in 1917. “It now means the energizing
of Nature to profitable crop production in land areas once deemed of no commercial value.”
While farmers of centuries past put the most accessible and productive lands under the plow, the
geographic landscapes of twentieth-century North America posed new barriers to the expansion
of agriculture. Tasked with converting deserts, cutover forest lands, and swamps into productive
farms, American farmers of the twentieth century “met the situation with determination and high
explosive.”99
The turn of the twentieth century demarcates a new stage of American agriculture. The
further development and expansion of farmlands, to meet the demands of a growing population
that settled new and geographically diverse regions, depended on large scale reclamation
projects. The proliferation and repurposing of chemical high explosive in agriculture in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century aided this process and had vast environmental
consequences. By the turn of the twentieth century, farmers used explosive farm implements to
restructure waterways for irrigation, clear cutover land to cultivate woodlands, and drain swamps
to access the nutrient rich souls that rested below the murky waters. Chemical high explosive
straddled the line between technology and energy. Contemporaries leverage this technology
against environmental limitations to agrarian progress. But unlike other new farm technologies,
chemical high explosives provided Americans with a new and accessible form of energy. This
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energy allowed farmers to overcome the environmentally dictated limitations to agrarian
development that plagued agriculturalists of previous generations.100
Employing chemical high explosive in the development of new and productive
farmlands, early-twentieth-century farmers reordered human relationships to the natural world.
Col. George G. King, president of the Institute of Makers of Explosives, declared, “Modern high
explosives can force a way through any obstacle nature has erected.”101 Straightening crooked
streams, subsoiling, and stump blasting, farmers, the agricultural state, and chemical
manufactures conformed nature to human visions of agricultural development. In other words,
industrial agriculture, as it developed in this period, restructured existing ecosystems to create
agroecosystems.102
Though agriculture was not the only industry dependent on the restructuring of
landscapes, the overwhelming demand for acreage required to support the industry translated
into an elevated dependence on environmental rationalization. The legal pathways required for
these developments emerged as reclamation legislation like the National Reclamation Act of
1902, which furnished the capital and engineering expertise necessary to reclaim lands on such a
large scale and the organization of the Tri-State Land Development Congress that prompted
cutover land reclamation in Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin. But these efforts did not solely
emanate from the imagination of federal and state government. Individual settlers, albeit inspired
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to move west by federally sponsored boosterism, lobbied for federal reclamation projects while
private companies capitalized on the demands for improved farmland. The interplay between
these actors transformed this agrarian vision into a reality.103
This chapter explores the rise of agroecosystems in the United States’ arid regions and
vast cutover lands. In the arid regions of the country, the federal government funded the
construction of complex irrigation networks and led movements for farm development. While
these projects fundamentally restructured broad swaths of desert in the West, the unforeseen
circumstances of speculative land buying, and excessive cost of land improvement set in motion
the process through which small farms would be consolidated into industrial agribusinesses. In
the nation’s cutover regions, agricultural colleges, state extension services, experiment stations,
chemical manufacturers, and railroad companies organized the efforts of individual farmers who
helped economically revitalize and ecologically reorder vast acres of stump land.
Ordinary farmers participated in both of these environmental transformations, but in
localized efforts to improve their farms, these individuals also used chemical high explosives to
fashion agroecosystems. In large part, chemical manufacturers made these alterations possible.
Du Pont and Hercules promoted the environmentally transformative nature of their products,
which idealized rationalized farms. Motivated by economic factors, individuals consumed
explosives to secure financial stability, but in the aggregate, these actions transformed the face of
North America. Swamplands grew fruit and nut trees, deserts produced wheat and citrus, and
cutover lands produced alfalfa and corn. But as agroecosystems began to dominate the continent
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of North America, farmers developed new dependencies on the chemical products and
mechanical implements required to sustain production.
Making the Desert Bloom
In reclaiming arid lands, early-twentieth-century Americans used chemical high
explosives in extensive ecological restructurings. From the passage of the Reclamation Act in
1902 until 1925 major irrigation projects furnished a full water supply for approximately 1.5
million acres of arid land. An additional 1,000,000 acres had received a partial supply of water.
Government projects alone supplied more than 35,000 farmers with the opportunity to cultivate
these arid regions. By 1921, federally irrigated farm projects produced more than $64,000,000 in
crops annually. Because this was area largely considered unsuitable for agriculture before the
twentieth century, there is no record of economic production in the arid regions prior to 1902.
But in 1927, historians Arthur Pin Van Gelder and Hugo Schlatter estimated that before 1902,
farmers of the region never produced more than $1,000,000 worth of farm products for any given
year.104
While efforts to irrigate the West began as early as the 1840s, large scale hydration of the
West was primarily a twentieth-century venture. The National Reclamation Act of 1902
appropriated “the receipts from the sale and disposal of public lands in certain States and
Territories to the construction of irrigation works for the reclamation of arid lands,” and
catalyzed this change. In 1906, federal projects irrigated 22,300 acres of arid land producing a
total crop value of $244,900. By 1930, the irrigated acreage totaled 1,504,810 and the total crop
value from those acres amounted to $64,418,940. The cumulative total of generated wealth for
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that same year was $1,100,859,341.105 Legislating the Reclamation Service into existence, the
National Reclamation Act set in motion the fundamental transformation of arid lands into a
factory of industrial food production.
In large part, these major economic developments and ecological restructurings rested on
the explosive energies of chemical high explosives that aided the construction of intricate
irrigation networks and reservoirs. This is evident in the nature of reclamation work. From 1902
to 1925, workers excavated approximately 250,000,000 cubic yards of dirt and rock; built more
than 15,700 miles of canals, ditches, and drains; and carved 29 miles of tunnels. Chemical high
explosives aided all of these tasks. Dynamite was also central to the production of the “2,400,000
cubic yards of rip rap, 3,760,000 cubic yards of concrete, and…3,530,000 barrels of cement”
used in reclamation projects in the same period of time.106 Reclamation projects depended on the
outputs of the quarrying industry, and with the exception of mining, quarrying operations
consumed more high explosive than any other twentieth-century industry.107
The history of Colorado’s Uncompahgre Valley illustrates the transformative effects of
reclamation projects and reveals the importance of chemical high explosives in the rise of
industrial agriculture. By 1919, 5,471 settlers resided in the Uncompahgre Valley and owned
1526 farms encompassing and area of 60,906 acres of irrigated land. Collectively, these farms
produced $3,391,456 worth of crops from the soils of the arid Colorado Valley that only two
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decades before struggled to support a meager 10,000 acres of irrigated farms.108 Historically,
members of the Ute tribe, a large group of indigenous peoples that occupied the Great Basin
region of Colorado, called the Uncompahgre Valley home. But in 1881, the U.S. government
forcibly removed the Ute to Utah to make room for white settlers. Thousands of settlers entered
to stake their claims in the valley with the hopes of creating productive farms. 109
The arid Uncompahgre Valley was historically unsuitable for intensive agriculture. To
address this, early settlers excavated “ditches for the purpose of irrigation,” diverting the waters
of the Uncompahgre River so that crops could be grown. With irrigation, the farmers “discovered
that the soil possessed remarkable productive power” explained Barton Walter Marsh, a resident
of the valley who recorded the region’s history in 1905. “But along with this pleasing fact it soon
became apparent that the water supply afforded by the Uncompahgre River was insufficient to
properly water the lands already occupied.”110 To realize the vision of white agrarian settlement,
residents of Uncompahgre needed to address the valley’s limited supply of water.
The lack of water in the Uncompahgre Valley served as a natural barrier to economic
development. In many ways, the environmental factors that characterized the region largely
defined the nature of settlement and economic development. In the 1880s and 1890s, settlers
placed so many demands on the Uncompahgre River that many aspiring homesteaders were
forced to abandon their plots, “Which were by that act allowed to relapse into a wilderness.” As
the flows the river decreed that settlers could exploit no more than 10,000 acres of the valley’s
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nutrient rich soils, a certain equilibrium existed between humans and nature that would soon be
challenged.111
Motived by economic desires, settlers of the region and critical arms of the agricultural
state reimaged the ecological make-up of the arid Colorado valley. Describing the region in
1905, Barton Marsh declared that the Uncompahgre Valley was “destine to become, within a
short time, one of the most beautiful and fruitful garden spots on the face of the earth.” Four
years later, the Chicago Tribune reported “110,000 acres of land now seemingly an arid desert
and covered chiefly with sage brush, will through the agency of the United States, be
transformed into a garden spot.” To achieve this vision of a landscape transformed, settlers
needed to renegotiate the established relationship between humans and nature. The answer was
simple. To properly irrigate the valley, settlers needed to divert water from the Gunnison River,
which flowed just sixteen miles away, into the Uncompahgre Valley. But sixteen miles of granite
known as the Squaw Mountains stood between the farmers and their transformative dreams.112
Financially and technologically, the vision appeared unattainable until the twentieth century.
Responding to local agitation, the federal government made the ecological
transformations a reality. Early residents of the valley credited a French immigrant named
Lauzon as the first person to imagine the diversion of the Gunnison River. Organizing lectures in
“school houses” and pontificating on “street corners,” Lauzon drummed up support for the
project by August 1904. The three Colorado counties of Ouray, Montrose, and Delta appointed
civil engineers, Walter Fleming and Richard Whinerah to conduct preliminary surveys. Fleming
and Whinerah concluded that the only practicable means of diversion would be to tunnel through
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the mountains. With sufficient support from the community, district representative, the Hon.
John C. Bell, lobbied the Reclamation Service to appropriate the funds and engineering expertise
necessary to complete the task. By October 18, 1904, under the authority of the National
Reclamation Act of 1902, the Reclamation Service approved a contract for the construction of
the six-mile Gunnison Tunnel and 11-mile canal to command the waters of the Gunnison River
into the fields of the Uncompahgre Valley at a total cost of $3,006,465.30.113 But ecological
transformations of this scale required more than just monetary backing and engineers.
Tunneling through the continental divide required massive amounts of energy, and by the
twentieth century, chemical high explosives made this energy attainable and affordable. The
team of engineers in charge of blasting operations decided on the use of both 40 and 60 percent
standard dynamite, with workers using 60 percent charges for the bulk of the blasting. According
to a 1914 report of the Bureau of Mines, “nearly 30 pounds of 40 per cent and 60 pounds of 60
per cent gelatin dynamite was employed per round” in the construction of the Gunnison Tunnel.
This was “equivalent to approximately 5.5 pounds per cubic yard excavated.”114
While workers used dynamite’s explosive energies to reshape the contours of a river and
excavate a tunnel through a mountain, the energy stored in dynamite’s chemical bonds also
eroded nature’s leverage against the exploitative developments of people eager to commodify the
nutrients rich soils in the Uncompahgre Valley. Settlers utilized the waters of the Gunnison River
to raise wheat, oats, potato’s, barley, alfalfa, and 17 types of vegetables from the arid ground.
But fruit cultivation was the primary industry in this period as Uncompahgre Valley farmers had
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their eyes set on national markets. By 1920, the region produced 7,143,600 pounds of apples,
which far exceeded all other crops.115 The vested interest of the federal government in peopling
the West to establish national control and the economic desires and agitations of individuals and
communities of settlers who sought to improve their financial conditions transformed the
Uncompahgre Valley into a well-managed agroecosystem. Both visions rested on changes of
established ecological orders. While the forceful removal of indigenous peoples and legally
authorized sale of public lands encouraged expansion, the agitations of settlers prompted further
infrastructural development. By 1920, their collective efforts irrigated 50,000 additional acres of
arid land that generated close to $3.5 million worth of crops annually.116
The Uncompahgre Valley Project and the creation of the Gunnison tunnel were not
anomalies in the history of land reclamation. The construction of many irrigation projects
depended on chemical high explosives. The irrigation of Utah’s Strawberry Valley required the
construction of the Strawberry tunnel—a 19,200-foot passage through the Wasatch Mountains
that helped supply 47,560 acres of previously arid land with water by 1924. Workers used 40
percent dynamite to hallow out the “hard blue limestone and hard, course-grained sandstone”
mountain.117
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Beyond the works of the federal government, private enterprises engaged in ecological
transformations as well. The Laramie-Poudre Reservoirs and Irrigation Company constructed the
Laramie Poudre Tunnel, an 11,306-foot irrigation passage near Greeley, Colorado. Working to
supply 125,000 acres of arid land with the water supply necessary to grow crops, workers used
60 percent and 100 percent dynamite to excavate the passage. Depending on the type of rock
being removed, blasting technicians used between 3.9 and 4.9 pounds of dynamite per cubic yard
of material removed to create a tunnel with a carrying capacity of “800 cubic feet [of water] per
second.” Completed in 1911, the tunnel never fully achieved its environmentally transformative
potential because of an 11-year lawsuit over water rights to the Laramie River between Colorado
and Wyoming that eventually went to the Supreme Court of the United States. Throughout the
litigation process water continued to flow through tunnel. Concluded in 1922, the High Court
appropriated approximately half of the water supply that investors in the tunnel had originally
anticipated. This spelled financial ruin for the Laramie-Poudre Reservoirs and Irrigation
Company and the speculative investors in the region, but still, the tunnel increased the water
supply in and around Greeley, Colorado allowing settlers to exploit its nutrient rich soils despite
limits nature had previously imposed. In 1910, one year before the tunnel’s completion, the
Greeley Valley supported a total of 3981 farms. The restricting of waterways permitted an
additional 1,784 farms—5765 in total. By 1925, due to court ordered water restrictions, that
number fell to 5610, still a significant increase from 1910, when natural limitations still largely
dictated the development of agriculture in the valley.118
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Reclamation works consumed chemical high explosives in more than just tunneling
operations. In the construction of reservoirs that stored the waters destine for irrigation, dynamite
aided workers as well. Laborers in Idaho’s Boise Project harnessed the powers of dynamite in
other foundational operations. The success of the Boise Project rested on the ability of engineers
to effectively store enough water for continuous irrigation during southern Idaho’s dry season,
which lasted from April to October. The answer to this problem was the creation of Arrowrock
Dam, 22 miles above Boise, Idaho, to store the water necessary for the irrigation of 255,000
acres of land. With a massive radius of 672.5 feet for its upstream face, the Arrowrock Dam
required a solid bedrock foundation to be structurally sound. Workers excavated 330,000 cubic
yards of granite to expose an acre of bedrock approximately 80 feet below the existing riverbed.
To complete this monstrous task, project engineers employed dynamite. Du Pont representative
E. F. King explained, “Du Pont 40 per cent. Straight Nitroglycerin dynamite and Du Pont Black
Blasting Powder were used in this part of the work during the early stages.” But because of its
versatility in cold weather, “the Du Pont Company’s Red Cross Low Freezing Straight
Nitroglycerin dynamite was introduced on the work.” Additionally, in the excavation of 350,000
cubic yards of granite in the creation of the dam’s spillway, Du Pont brand “Monobel No. 6” a
low freezing permissible explosive, “was largely used in this part of the work.”119
With the Arrowcreek Dam completed in 1915, the Boise Project helped to rationalize
Idaho’s landscapes. Prior to the completion of this project, environmental determinates such as
the region’s average annual rainfall of 12.71 inches and the natural pathways of the Boise River
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determined the extent of agricultural production in the region. Environmental condition defined
the ecological order. But government officials and settlers harnessed the energy of chemical high
explosives to realize their shared vision of agriculturally viable farmland in southern Idaho. The
government underwrote complex irrigation networks with money and engineering expertise
while chemical high explosives eroded the foundations upon which laborers built these new
infrastructural marvels. By 1923, 112,000 acres of the initial 143,000 acres imagined as irrigable
farmland had access to the water necessary to raise $3,992,600 worth of crops.120 Thanks to the
energies of chemical high explosives, Idaho farmers overcame nature’s barriers to economic
development.
The construction of the Tieton Dam in Washington showed similar results. Part of the
larger Yakima Project of 1906, the Reclamation Service completed the Tieton Reservoir in 1925.
“Situated on the Tieton River, at Rimrock, Washington,” the Tieton Dam was an earth and rock
filled structure that measured “900 feet long and 25 feet wide” with a height of 321 feet.
According to reports from the Du Pont Chemical Company, from 1921 to its completion,
workers detonated “approximately 460,000 pounds of explosives.” In building the spillway
alone, workers, under the direction of construction engineer F. T. Crowe of the U.S. Reclamation
Service, used 16.4 tons of T.N.T. to remove approximately 41,100 cubic yards of rock. Upon
completion, the reservoir had a carrying capacity of “202,500 acre feet of water, sufficient to
irrigate 70,000 acres.” This far exceeded the 32,000 acres deemed irrigable in the Bureau of
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Reclamation’s surveys of the region. In its first year of operation, the reservoir’s water irrigated
27,650 acres of arid lands.121
While the federal government controlled major waterways and erected dams and canals,
ordinary farmers reimagined dynamite in their efforts to rationalize the landscapes of their
individual plots. In the Storm Lake Drainage District near Greeley, Colorado, “a considerable
portion” of the 800-acre area “was inundated as a result of seepage from the irrigation ditches” in
1920. The uncontrolled water flooded the productive farmland. Constructing a “drainage ditch
9,500 feet long,” local agricultural blaster Ben Marsh used dynamite to corral the flow of water
across the flooded arid landscape. As the Du Pont Magazine eagerly broadcast, “The undertaking
was completely successful. Next year this land, which unfortunately received too much of the
life-giving element that makes the desert bloom, will be producing bumper crops of hay and
sugar-beets…and there will be more money in it for the owner.”122 Dynamite drainage was not
unique to the West. In 1923, the Commissioner of the Drury Drainage District in Illinois hired a
Du Pont representative to clear “three and one-half miles” of a clogged drainage ditch that
threatened to flood farmland in the northern part of the Mississippi River Valley drainage. Using
8000 pounds of Du Pont nitroglycerine dynamite, the representative successfully cleared the
ditch of obstructions.123 As ditches required continual maintenance, farmers in irrigated districts
developed a new dependency on chemical high explosives. Harnessing dynamite’s explosive
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energy to effectively manage water supplies, ordinary farmers played a critical role in the
ecological transformations of arid lands as well.
As irrigation works helped bring deserts under cultivation, less obvious environmental
transformations were underway. As early as 1901, F. H. King, the professor of agricultural
physics at the University of Wisconsin observed the association between irrigation and
diminished concentrations of nitrogen in soils. King explained that “the application of too much
water to these lands might lead to the loss of so much plant food by leaching as to overcome any
advantage which might be derived from the irrigation.” Conducting a series of experiments, King
discovered “the amount of nitrates in the soil under irrigation” to be “less than that in the soil not
irrigated.” King witnessed a problem that still faces farmers of today. Like water, nitrates are
essential for plant growth. But because nitrates are water soluble, excessive water absorbs, or
leaches nitrates out of the soil preventing plants from extracting it with their roots. The
proliferation of agricultural irrigation projects at once provided farmers sufficient water supplies
and depleted the nitrate levels of their soils.124
Nitrate leaching created a number of problems for the American farmers. As irrigation
depleted nutrient rich soils, farms became depended on chemical fertilizers to replenish their
farms. In 1911, Irrigation Engineer C. E. Tait explored the relationship of irrigation and
fertilizers in the cultivation of citrus trees in Pomona, California. Tait explained that “both are
necessary for success,” and if a farmer fertilized during irrigation, the nutrients were “washed
into the subsoil requiring additional fertilizer to revitalize the orchard.”125 Irrigating over 1.5
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million acres of farmland between 1902 and 1930, American farmers consumed commercial
fertilizers to counteract leeching. Where in 1900 farmers used 2,730,000 tons of fertilizers to aid
production, they used 8,208,000 tons by 1929.126 The increased acreage of total farmland and
efforts to intensify crop production influenced fertilizer consumption as well, but the practice of
artificial irrigation contributed to the process. As such, the use of chemical high explosives in
irrigation works catalyzed new chemical dependencies in American agriculture as farmers in
irrigated fields relied on the use of chemical fertilizers.
From its inception, the Reclamation Service spearheaded the establishment of complex
irrigation networks. But as these examples show, the economic desires of settlers and businesses
also fueled these developments. For federal and state governments, these projects proved
financially successful with the total income of the Bureau of Reclamation far outweighing total
expensive of irrigation operations. By 1926 net income totaled $11,573,157.21 with total
expenses amounting to $2,402,316.91.127
American farmers experienced these developments differently. Congress passed the
National Reclamation Act of 1902 under the assumption that the transformation of arid lands into
small irrigable farms would be an inexpensive enterprise because “settlers would have virtually
free land, and that water would be cheap because the irrigation works would be constructed by
the Government without profit, and with interest free money.” In practice, speculation resulted
in inflated land prices, and the cost to develop 40 to 80-acre plots of unimproved land into farms
“was not only much greater than was anticipated,” but in many cases exceeded “the cost of
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canals and reservoirs.” While net production of farm goods in arid regions rose and contributed
to the nation’s GDP, the idea of small irrigated farms in the arid West began to give way to the
consolidation that took place over the next two decades to furnish the large-scale farms
characteristic of industrial agriculture by the end of World War II.128
Revitalizing Cutover Lands
In terms of ecologically transformative effects, the reclamation of cutover lands for
farming purposes differed from its counterpart in the arid regions of the country. While efforts to
irrigate the desert targeted the largely unmanaged ecologies of the West, stump land reclamation
was concentrated in regions where humans had already drastically restructured the existing
ecological order. Stump land reclamation also differed in the degree of government involvement.
Federal arms of the agricultural state promoted the reclamation of these cutover lands but with
limited financial and engineering support. Instead, ordinary farmers cooperating with chemical
manufacturers and state and local governments mobilized to restructure the nation’s broad
swaths of cutover land.
The United States’ lumbering industry flourished in the nineteenth century supplying the
nation with building materials and fuel. But by the twentieth century the economic effects of
mass deforestation stirred concern among government officials and business executives. In 1925,
W. B. Greeley, Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, explained “The progress of civilization has been
called a struggle between human wants and natural resources. And no part of this age-long
contest has been more clear cut than the effort of mankind to supply its need for wood.” By
1925, the United States consumed “22 ½ billion cubic feet [of lumber], or about two-fifths of the
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yearly consumption in the entire world.” Where in 1620 the total acreage of virgin forest in the
contagious United States was approximately 820,000,000, roughly 138,000,000 acres remained
by 1920 (see figures 1, 2, and 3).129 The eradication of nearly 700,000,000 acres of virgin forest,
the bulk of which was removed in the second half of the nineteenth century, in turn left broad
swaths cutover land that laid both devoid of forest resources and economic productivity. But
enterprising individuals reimagined these wastelands as productive farmlands.

Figure 1—U.S. Forest Service map of the area of
virgin forest in 1620

Figure 2—U.S. Forest Service map of the area of
virgin forest in 1850

Figure 3—U.S. Forest Service map of the area of
virgin forest in 1920
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As the first chapter illustrated, ordinary farmers used chemical high explosives to address
the issues that came with farming stumped land. Blasting their farms, these progressive
agriculturalists engaged in small scale environmental restructurings to achieve greater economic
output as early as the 1870s. By the twentieth century, critical arms of the agricultural state at
both the state and federal level, chemical manufacturers, and in many cases railroad executives
promoted the reclamation of cutover lands on a much larger scale than what was seen in the
nineteenth century.
During World War I, the federal government supported land reclamation through the
USDA. In the south, the USDA actively worked with chemical manufacturers to find solutions to
the problems facing southern farmers. By 1918, the sales department at Hercules, headed by W.
R. James, sought out ways in which the company could contribute to the war effort, and asked
government agencies, including the USDA, to endorse Hercules’ advertisements. USDA
director, Bradford Knapp, offered to cooperate if Hercules could find a solution to the issues of
deforestation and excessive cutover land, which troubled both southern agriculture and the
timber industry. Looking to diversify their markets, Hercules began to explore ways in which an
entry into the naval stores industry—the production of terpene and rosin products from pine
trees—could prove both lucrative for their business and as an effective means of addressing the
problems of southern industry.130
The southern naval stores industry suffered greatly in this period as a result of forest
depletion. This gave rise to new methods of resource extraction, mainly of tar oils and pitch,
which workers could effectively extract from fallen trees and stumps through a process called
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destructive distillation. This was opposed to extraction from living trees, which was the
traditional means of acquisition. The Hercules’ Industrial Research Department (IRD) and
Marketing Department increased marketing efforts to promote stump removal with Hercules
brand dynamite while simultaneously investing in the naval stores industry. They intended to
boost dynamite sales and reduce farmers’ experienced cost of land clearing by purchasing their
blasted stumps for destructive distillation. On May 3, 1920, Hercules secured a contract with
Newman Lumber Company in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, to clear 75,000 acres of longleaf pine
stumps with dynamite. This in turn provided Hercules with the raw materials needed to enter the
naval stores industry while simultaneously transforming the Newman Lumber Company’s
cutover land into property that could be sold as farmlands.131 The transformation of cutover lands
appeared economically lucrative for all the players involved. Hercules would be able to diversify
in naval stores, Newman Lumber Company could profit on the sale of cutover lands, and the
USDA and federal government would theoretically benefit from increased agricultural output in
the region. In turn, the forest ecology of the region was fundamentally restructured.
After the war, Americans expanded their efforts to clear cutover lands. As early as 1920,
the United States Department of Agriculture’s Division of Agricultural Engineering cooperated
with agricultural colleges and state officials to distribute surplus war explosives for the expressed
purposes of reclaiming cutover lands. S. H. McCrory, chief of the USDA Division of
Agricultural Engineering, reported that between July 1, 1922 and July 1, 1923 “a total of
4,179,550 pounds” of picric acid, a chemical high explosive similar to dynamite, “was
distributed to twenty different states” (see figure 3). The USDA directed the majority for the
surplus explosives to Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin where the lumbering industry had
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most drastically effected landscapes, but distribution also included southern states such as the
Carolinas, Georgia, and Tennessee as well as such western states as Arizona and California. In
addition to picric acid, government extension workers helped distribute sodatol, a mixture of
surplus sodium nitrate and TNT, to farmers across the country. The Division of Agricultural
Engineering, the University of Wisconsin, and the U.S. Bureau of Mines spearheaded the efforts.
Distributed in the same general manner as picric acid, sodatol offered farmers an explosive that
was “15 to 20 per cent stronger than ordinary dynamite” at a price “less than one-third of the
retail cost of dynamite.”132 Farmers used these cheap and readily available new explosives to
transform forests into farmland.

Figure 3—Table showing the distribution of military
surplus picric acid in 1922 and 1923.

While state officials from Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan independently organized
reclamation efforts in their respective states before the war, they cooperated in the post war years
to create the Tri-State Land Development Congress in 1921 with a goal of clearing the regions
35,000,000 acres of cutover land. Receding glaciers of the last ice age, approximately 10,000
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years ago, shaped the topography of the Great Lakes region, left rich mineral deposits, and
cleared the way for broad swaths of boreal forests. Before the time of white settlers, a large
number of native tribes called this region home. But the forest resources and mineral deposits of
the region attracted settlement after European contact, which supported the mining and lumber
industries that defined the region by the mid nineteenth century. In 1830, Wisconsin alone held
129,000,000,000 board feet of lumber, but by 1920, only 1,000,000,000 board feet remained
because of logging operations.133 After a century of clear cutting, the three states looked to
economically revitalize the millions of acres of decimated forest lands.134
The agricultural college of Wisconsin’s close connection with surplus war explosives
allowed the state to be a leader in these reclamation efforts. In 1921, Wisconsin farmers
effectively cleared 150,000 acres of previously stumped land, which translated into
approximately 4.5 acres per settler. Just five years earlier, residents of Wisconsin cleared no
fewer than 30,000 acres a year. Chemical high explosives were central to this accelerated
transformation of the landscape. In the first six months of 1921, Wisconsin farmers “shot over
2,000,000 pounds of explosives in their battle against the stumps.” Describing the achievement,
George H. Dacy, contributor to Farm Mechanics, stated, “as practically all of the cutover land is
virgin, fertile soil, its reclamation and utilization for farming purposes is one of the greatest
agricultural achievements which could be consummated in the states which have been leaders in
lumbering.”135
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Similar events transpired in Minnesota. Minnesota’s white pine forests attracted nonnative settlers to Beltrami County and the town of Bemidji in the nineteenth century, and the new
settlers created a “railroad and lumber center.” After depleting much of the forest’s resources,
these new citizens expressed great concern over the fate of their community. In 1921, the
Bemidji Commercial Club hosted a special meeting with “representatives of the State University,
the railroads, the press, the banks, and farmers and business men” to devise a plan for the
revitalization of Bemidji’s “neighboring villages and the surrounding agricultural territory.” The
attendees concluded that if Bemidji was to remain as a center of trade then “agricultural
interests” were of the utmost importance. Plagued by stumped fields, local farmers present at the
meeting lobbied to “clear more land.” According to an article published in Du Pont Magazine,
“That was the forward to a unanimous vote to begin upbuilding Bemidji with dynamite: for these
men realized that every acre of stump cleared, developed and put into crops was a potential
source of profit to the farmers as well as to every business interest in the city.” Organizing the
Beltrami Country Land Clearing Association, the community set funding goals and a land
clearing quota of 15,000 acres for the first year. A. W. Stone, business manager and
representative board member of the Association, organized demonstrations in corroboration with
the Du Pont Company to convey the most economical blasting methods to be used in stump
removal. Following the demonstrations, “farmers pooled their orders for explosives.” By May
27, the railroad had delivered “ten cars of dynamite” and “operations were started in all sections
of the county.” By the end of summer, workers added more than 15,000 acres “to the producing
area.” With fall work underway, the cooperative efforts of the Beltrami County community
members far exceeded the annual quota of 15,000 acres.136
“Building Up Bemidji with Dynamite,” Du Pont Magazine Vol. 15, No. 5 (November-December
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Residents of Beltrami County successfully cleared cutover lands with chemical high
explosives, but natural limitations continued to bar economic development. Where in 1910
Bemidji and broader Beltrami County supported 1577 farms, there was 3065 by the end of 1920.
But in 1925, only 2534 remained. Farmers uncalculated reclamation efforts contributed to the
failing of farms. When they began blasting in 1920, the residents of Bemidji did not investigate
the agricultural viability of the land they cleared. As such, a portion of the cleared land failed to
produce bountiful harvest.137 While new chemical energies drastically altered landscapes and
facilitated the rise of agroecology, certain environmental barriers remained. Farmers in Bemidji
showed that even when cleared of stumps, some lands failed preform as farm land.
In addition to environmental limitations, the postwar agricultural depression of the 1920s
created economic barriers to success as well. Bemidji like the rest of the nation’s agricultural
regions suffered from a nearly fifty percent decrease in farm prices that followed the conclusion
of World War I. Addressing these issues, farmers worked to create national agricultural
cooperatives and gain legislative support from sympathetic congressional representatives known
as the Farm Bloc as early as 1920. Organizers like Aaron Shapiro, a California lawyer who
represented several agricultural cooperatives, worked to establish a national grain cooperative in
the early 1920s, but due to organizational difficulties, the project collapsed. Additionally, farm
legislation that passed in the 1920s supported cooperative efforts and expanded credit but lacked
the capacity to address the underlying problem—insufficient demand, both foreign and domestic,
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for farm products. While prices recovered slightly in 1925, agricultural markets remained dismal
into the 1930s.138
Nevertheless, easy credit and cooperation bolstered efforts to clear cutover land in the
northern region of the United States. It Aitken County, Minnesota, local banker E. O. Buhler
helped furnish the credit necessary for local residents to purchase land clearing dynamite. “The
settlers had done nobly in blowing up the stumps” explained Buhler, which left many acres ready
to be turned. But the “cradle knolls, stones and tangled web of roots that [was] the heritage of the
stump field” exposed “a lack of sufficient horse power” in the region. Farmers found that horse
and mule teams often times did not possess enough power to turn the blasted fields. The solution
was the tractor. Buhler explained that tractors gave “a new stimulus to the clearing game” as the
increased horsepower turned the soils in preparation for cultivation.139 Between 1920 and 1930
tractor owner ship increased from approximately 250,000 to nearly 900,000 on American farms.
This transformation manifested most drastically in the northern region of the country where
farmers concentrated their efforts to blast stumped lands. Northern farmers owned about two
thirds of the nation’s tractors by 1930.140 As chemical high explosives cleared new farmland,
farmers adopted and at times depended on mechanical implements to fashion agroecosystems in
the once forested northern United States.
In prompting mechanization and the proliferation of tractor ownership, chemical high
explosive indirectly liberated many farmers from their dependencies on working livestock that
required grazing land and the cultivation of feed crops. By 1930, farmers owned nearly

138

Cochrane, Development of American Agriculture, 114-120.
E. O. Buhler, “New Facts and Figures,” Minutes and Papers of the Third Annual Tri-State
Development Congress of Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota (January 1923), 76-77
140
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, and US Department of Agriculture, Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, 1950 Census of Agriculture Special Reports: Agriculture 1950: A Graphic
Summary (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), 78.
139

76

7,500,000 fewer mules and horses than they did in 1920. According to the USDA’s Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, the removal of horses and mules made available an addition 25,500,000
acres of cropland in that same period (See figure 4).141

Figure 4

While states with large cutover land reclamation projects naturally received the majority
of the surplus war explosives, ordinary farmers engaged in the ecologically transformative
practice independent of state-wide movements. In the winter of 1923-1924, the Extension
Service in Oregon distributed approximately 1,000,000 pounds of sodatol to its farmer
constituents who desired to remove stumps. One of the state’s county agents, O. T. McWhorther,
“secured 217,000 pounds of sodatol for farmers in his territory” near Portland.142 Because the
state had not organized any formal efforts, agricultural engineer for the Oregon State College,
Geo. W. Kable explained, “The demand for sodatol was quite beyond our expectations,
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inasmuch as no large reclamation projects were on hand.” While major developments provoked
the bulk of the forest land transformations, independent efforts, in the aggregate, amounted to
significant ecological restructuring as well.
The transformation of cutover lands demonstrates the collaborative efforts involved in the
transformation of forest lands into productive farmland. Farmers, business owners, chemical
manufacturers, and public officials, driven by economic motives, collectively established
agroecosystems where forests once stood. Though largescale human intervention into the
ecological order that defined the region since the last ice age began with the logging industry, the
implementation of chemical high explosives’ energies elevated the region to a new “plateau of
development.”143 The lumber industry exploited forest products creating vast cutover lands, but
chemical high explosives’ energies allowed humans to assert greater environmental control in
what W. B. Greeley, Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, called the “struggle between human wants
and natural resources.”144 But as the failed farmlands in Bemidji showed, ecological and
economic barriers remained.
Unlike arid land reclamation where the Bureau of Reclamation led the projects, state and
local enterprises commanded the transformation the cutover lands. According to the 1921 report
of the Tri-State Land Development Congress, “the reclamation of the cut-overs…is primarily a
task that can be done by the individual,” and “perhaps nothing is more indicative of land clearing
effort than the use of explosives.” The USDA division of Agricultural Engineers cooperated in
these efforts, but ordinary farmers did most of the work and used tens of millions of pounds of
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high explosives to reclaim these lands in the first three decades of the twentieth century. In the
first three years after World War I, Wisconsin alone reclaimed approximately 300,000 acres, and
representatives from the Tri-State congress estimated that farmers used between 2,500,000 and
3,000,000 of high explosives per 100,000 acres of land cleared.145 In 1921, Minnesota farmers
blasted “2,000,000 pound of dynamite” and cleared 40,000 acres.146 In the aggregate, these
farmers participated in the broader contest between human desire for economic development and
nature. Every stump blasted was an expression of dominance, the physical erosion of an existing
ecology, and the emergence of a new agroecological order in which human desire ultimately
restructured landscapes.
Creating a Narrative for Localized Transformations
Well-organized and cooperative efforts to expand agricultural production in the early
twentieth century reclaimed the country’s arid and cutover lands. Even though ordinary farmers,
especially in the transformation of cutover lands, actively engaged in the labors of these
developments, state and federal programs acted as vital catalysts. But the transformative ends of
explosive agriculture went beyond these well-organized projects. New forms of explosive
agriculture, many of which were described in the first chapter, were themselves a form of
ecological restructuring. As Americans reimagined chemical high explosives as a tool for the
farm, farmers directed dynamite’s energies towards economic productivity while also
rationalizing landscapes. Best illustrated in the advertisement campaigns of explosive
manufactures and in popular media accounts, the individual uses of chemical high explosives on
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the farm, including tree planting, subsoiling, drainage work, and the diversion of streams, fueled
a larger media-driven narrative that painted agricultural development as a battle between nature
and progress. Chemical high explosives helped turn the tide of this ongoing war.
In their efforts to cultivate an agricultural market for their explosive products, chemical
manufacturers influenced this development. In many cases, the advertisement campaigns of
Hercules and Du Pont directly addressed the environmentally transformative capabilities of their
explosive products. In 1918, one Du Pont advertisement coined dynamite “the builder of
nations” and “a titanic laborer—wresting…Mother Earth.” That same year Du Pont asked the
farm owning readers of the Literary Digest if their property had a “crooked, land-eating stream
waiting to be straightened.” Personifying the stream as the “land-eating” enemy, the
advertisement cast dynamite as an effective agent in the contest between the environment and
profitable farming. In 1919, Hercules ran its “Dynamite Makes Fertile Fields of Swamp Land”
campaign in which the marketing department touted dynamite’s ability to transform “sixty
million acres of swamp land” into “the most fertile farm land.”147 In promoting their products,
chemical manufacturers created a narrative in which the progress of industrial agriculture
depended on the domination of nature.
In virtually every application, manufacturers depicted dynamite as the solution to
environmental barriers to agricultural progresses. The marketing department at Du Pont created
an advertisement in 1918 titled, “Does Labor Shortage Worry You?” While the text of the advert
touted dynamite’s ability to “save time, money, and work,” the illustration highlighted the
rationalizing effects of their explosive products (See Figure 2). Depicted is a clenched fist
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holding a stick of Du Pont brand Red Cross Dynamite emanating from which is four clouds of
explosive gases. In each cloud is a drawing of different applications for dynamite on the farm
where a farmer is seen engaged in stump removal, rock removal, ditch digging, and subsoiling,
symbolizing the capabilities of the expanding gases of chemical high explosive in rationalizing
these natural barriers to economic progress.148

Figure 5

Creating a narrative, these advertisements effectively bolstered individual farmers’ efforts
to environmentally rationalize their farms. In 1922, Minnesota farmer L. G. Kaufman instructed
four of his laborers to excavate a 700-foot ditch, “12 feet wide, and 4 ½ feet deep,” to drain 200
acres of swamp that prevented him from cultivating the entirety of his property. Placing charges
20 inches apart and working in section of 200 feet at a time, the workers managed to create an
effective ditch in “half a day.” Dynamite’s explosive energies effectively drained the swamp and
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converted Kaufman’s property into “valuable farm land.”149 Kaufman restructured the ecological
order of his Minnesota farm.

Figure 6—Image from Popular Science Monthly showing water filling
the ditch on Kaufman’s farm immediately after blasting

Before the 1920s, the winding trajectory of the Elkhorn River near Waterloo, Nebraska
limited farmers’ abilities to exploit the region’s nutrient rich soils. To address this limitation,
farmers collectively worked to cut a two-mile channel that created a more straight and direct
flow for the river. Using dynamite to blast the right of way before finishing the cut with a dredge,
workers eliminated eight miles of the meandering river and opened up many additional acres for
cultivation.150 In rationalizing the river, farmers not only engaged in the restructuring of its flows
but created streamlined plots of land. The idea of 160-acre square plots of land, written into the
Homestead Act of 1862, was itself incompatible with the geographical makeup of the contiguous
United States. The order of nature did not conform to the legally dictated cookie cutter
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homestead, and as such, the agricultural state, ordinary farmers, and chemical manufacturers
worked to conform nature to their rationalized vision of agricultural development. For many
years these efforts proved unattainable due to limited funding or lack of technical development
and engineering knowhow, but chemical high explosives changed that fact.
Less directly, the development of agricultural explosives with weather resistant and
regionally specific properties propagated the idea of a contest between humans and nature. In the
spring of 1920, Du Pont released its updated formula of “straight dynamite,” the companies
standard and most universally applicable explosives. “While possessing all the desirable feature
of the old straight” explained Du Pont Technical Representative, S. R. Russell, the new
formulation had “the additional [feature] of being extremely low freezing.” He announced,
“During the past winter the new Du Pont Straight Dynamite remained soft and in good condition
at 10 degrees.”151 Seasons and climate no longer determined blasting schedules. In the first
decade of the twentieth century, Du Pont developed Pacific Stumping Powder “particularly for
blasting the large stumps of the Pacific Northwest.” In 1922, the company reworked the formula
to give the regionally specific explosive low freezing characteristics as well.152 In designating the
explosive as regionally specific, Du Pont’s engineers implicitly cast their products as
environmentally transformative. The need for these new products resulted from the limitation
that nature, through environmental conditions such as climate and geographic place, imposed on
agricultural production and blasting.
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By the 1920s, contested views on dynamite’s application in subsoiling had largely passed
the experimental stage, and its uses, though not universal, were accepted as beneficial. In an
April 1925 issue of Popular Science, it was reported that “This particular use of dynamite has
become widespread, in the setting out of orchards, for example. Moreover, extraordinary results
are on record where orchards have practically ceased bearing and were rejuvenated through the
loosening of the soil with dynamite.” The Du Pont pamphlet New Farms for Old Through Deep
Plowing with Du Pont Red Cross Low Freezing Dynamite and periodical Vertical Farming made
this application widely known and highlighted the utility of subsoiling as early as 1911. As
explained in New Farms for Old, subsoiling with dynamite:
breaks up the hardpan and permits the roots to take their downward course into the lower
strata of the soil in which plenty of plant food elements are available. Under these
conditions one tree in not interfered with by another; each one receives the benefits of all
of the soil allotted to it at the time the surface was measured and aid out at planting
time.153
In many ways, subsoiling with dynamite was no different than its uses in irrigation and cutover
land reclamation. In part because of media accounts and chemical manufacturers’ advertisement
campaigns that cast explosives as environmentally combative, farmers used high explosives to
gain more control over the environments in which they worked to establish control in their
agroecosystems.
Conclusion
In 1929, A. J. Schwantes, Assistant Professor of Agricultural Engineering at the
University of Minnesota, described the importance of power increases in agriculture since the
1850s. Schwantes explained that in 1850, “the average agricultural worker in the United States
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had at his disposal about 1½ horse power” and that “all of this power was furnished by animals.”
By the 1890s, with the democratization of pack animals and advent of steam engines, access
increased to approximately 2½ horse power. With the introduction of tractors, electricity, and gas
engines, farm workers had access to an average of 3 ¾ horse power per worker by 1920. The
next major development in farm power was dynamite. The reinvention of chemical high
explosives as a tool for the farm was emblematic of the transition to new forms of energy that
occurred across the country. As gasoline and coal supplanted wood and water power, so too did
chemical high explosive supplant human and animal labor on the farm. This transition did not
mark the start of ecological transformations through development in agriculture as much as it
was an acceleration of the efforts, made possible through increased access to energy. While
dynamite’s energies could not be used for harvesting and other jobs on the farm, the new “farm
power” accelerated erosion of environmental barriers to agricultural development and facilitated
the processes of farm mechanization.154
Irrigating the desert, clearing cutover lands, and engaging in local farm improvements,
the agricultural state, chemical manufacturers, and ordinary farmers employed chemical high
explosives to environmentally transformative ends. Their desires to increase agricultural outputs
translated into a wholesale effort to conform nature to the rationalized vision of agrarian
development. But the command of nature was not universal. Many acres of reclaimed lands
failed to perform as farmland, and areas that did produce contributed to the problems of
overproduction that plagued agriculture in the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, dynamite lacked the
capacity to address the falling global demand for farm products, and while it proved useful in
clearing land and watering deserts, dynamite’s energies could not improve nutrient deficient soils
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and agriculturally unfavorable climate conditions. When Americans restructured environments
for agriculture, they crystalized new dependencies on the chemical and technology required to
produce food in ecologically unviable landscapes.
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Epilogue:
Chemical Dependencies in Modern American Agriculture
In 1891, special agent Robert Dyrenforth of the U.S. Department of Agriculture tried to
use dynamite to make it rain. Inspired by Civil-War stories where the concussive blast of artillery
shells reportedly caused precipitation, Dyrenforth conducted a series of investigations into the
matter. Stationed on a cattle farm near Midland, Texas where the flat topography and proximity
to water made irrigation impractical, Dyrenforth set out to water Great Plains’ farms with the aid
of dynamite. The research party organized tests along three lines, “each some two miles in length
and placed about one-half mile apart.” The first line contained charges of ground-placed
dynamite and rackarock, another nitroglycerine-based explosive. The second consisted of cloth
kites, “flown to a considerable height with electric wires, bearing dynamite charges…to be fired
high in the air.” A third line featured explosive balloons filled with hydrogen and oxygen gas.
With charges in place, the explosions began on August 18. Dyrenforth’s team detonated ground
explosives for 12 hours and periodically ignited “balloon explosions,” but the region’s high
winds rendered the second line of kites impracticable. Nevertheless, ground crews “kept up their
roar” until the early evening when the “clear and beautiful” sky yielded to “drenching rain which
fell in torrents for two and a half hours.” Satisfied with the results, Dyrenforth proclaimed that
“the concussion from explosions exerts a marked and practical effect upon the atmospheric
conditions in producing or occasioning rainfall.” Or put more simply, dynamite could make
rain.155
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But could it? Other government officials had their doubts. For Simon Newcomb, a U.S.
Naval Observatory astronomer and member of the National Academy of Science, Dyrenforth’s
experiments were at best inconclusive and at worst fundamentally flawed. Dyrenforth’s team had
foolishly blasted the sky during the rainy season, which, Newcomb argued, invalidated any
causal relationship between the explosions and the precipitation. More fundamentally, Newcomb
objected, any conclusions about concussive rainmaking were woefully premature because the
scientific community lacked a sufficient understanding of how rain formed in the atmosphere.
Ideally, further experimentation would yield this vital knowledge, but for now, uncertainty was
the order of the day.156 But still, even if the explosions had caused the rain, Dyrenforth’s
methods, Newcomb lamented, were at this point far too expensive. The two- and one-half hours
of rain cost American taxpayers $9000, a large sum of money for a relatively limited supply of
water.157
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, farmers, businesses, and arms of the state
experimented, often times haphazardly if not desperately, to see what dynamite could do. While
they would eventually learn that making rain exceeded chemical high explosives’ capacious
capacities, their enthusiasm for determining explosives’ other possibilities would not be defused.
In fact, popular conceptions of chemical high explosives, as able to reduce “to a minimum the
opposing forces nature has placed in the various highways advancing civilization,” remained
strong and fueled the scientific processes responsible for dynamite’s proliferation in
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agriculture.158 By the 1920s, experimentation, reinvention, and faith in new technologies and
energies had made high chemical explosives a vital arm of modern, industrial agriculture.
As late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Americans blasted the way to agricultural
development, they renegotiated human relationships with the natural world. Raising farm crops
had long required human management of agroecosystems, but in the early-twentieth century this
intensified in part because of explosives. Before the 1870s, the locations in which these managed
environments could exist and thrive depended on such environmental conditions as weather, soil
composition, and proximity to sufficient water sources. With the advent of new high explosives
in the late 1860s and their application to farming and farm-related industries, Americans of this
period maximized the productivity of existing farmland and greatly expanded the total acreage of
potential farmland by redefining what potential farmland was. Providing elevated access to
energy and facilitating mechanical implantation, chemical high explosives liberated agricultural
expansion from natural, environmental, and geographic constraints and ushered in a new era of
agricultural development in which explosive energy rationalized, from contemporaries’
perspective, previously unproductive and underproductive lands. Indeed, this was the promise of
modern agriculture, a promise that explosives helped Americans achieve.
Expanding into these newly redefined farming regions, ordinary farmers, chemical
manufacturers, and the agricultural state put their faith in the power of chemicals to solve many
if not all problems. This rising chemical addiction informed experimentation and reclamation
efforts, but at times, chemical high explosives’ capabilities fell short of expectations. This was
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largely the case in the arid West. In the Reclamation Service’s twenty-third annual report in
1924, Commissioner Elwood Mead stated:
Discussion in Congress, official reports, and articles in the press, all bear
testimony to the fact that a change is taking place in our conception of what is
needed to make national reclamation by irrigation a social and economic success.
All are agreed that a lofty purpose animated the framers of the national
reclamation act; yet all familiar with its history realize that not all the conditions
under which it would operate were foreseen, and that the results are unlike those
anticipated.159
Explosives aided the construction of irrigation works, but Americans soon discovered that
sustained production in the region would necessitate further inputs. By the 1920s it was clear that
modern industrial agriculture would depend upon synthetic, chemical energy and increasingly,
fossil fuel energy to put as much land into production as possible.
Dynamite’s explosive blast did its part in rationalizing landscapes, but the ability of its
rapidly expanding gases to generate productive soils and condense water molecules into rain
proved a scientific improbability. These limitations revealed new challenges. Americans began
to pursue new approaches to farming on reclaimed lands that manifested in increased inputs of
capital and energy, tenets of intensive agriculture, to improve harvests. In 1928, the Bureau of
Reclamation reported that intensive farming practices were the “only way that success in
irrigation can be achieved.” In the timbered North, A. U. Morrell of the Tri-State Land
Development Congress declared “intensive cultivation” the best way to “ensure larger returns per
acre” and to solve “the labor problems on the farm.”160 While reclamation land farming in the
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1920s did not mark the beginning of agricultural intensification, it accelerated the process. When
World War I ended and farm prices fell, farmers in less productive reclaimed regions were
especially susceptible to economic hardship. These farmers turned to chemical fertilizers and to a
lesser extent, mechanical implements powered by fossil fuels as they adjusted to the financial
situation. This contributed to issues of overproduction that sustained low farm prices and
established a system in which agriculture depended on even greater human and synthetic inputs
and controls to remain economically viable.161
While contemporaries did not entirely understand the environmental significance of these
agricultural developments, scientists have recently recognized the broader environmental
consequences of nitrogen fertilizers and fossil fuel dependency in intensive agriculture. In 2002
Ronald F. Follet and Jorge A. Delgado, soil scientists for the U.S. Department of Agricultural
Research Service, reported that Nitrogen (N) “inputs are necessary for maintaining the viability
of intensive agricultural systems” and that “extensive use of N in agricultural systems and the
associated transformations of N into various ions or gaseous forms contributes to leaks from the
nitrogen cycle.” These leaks have had major environmental effects. Water-soluble nitrates leach
out of the soil and are “a primary source of the contamination in drinking water” around the
globe. Furthermore, when nitrate fertilizers are introduced into agricultural systems,
denitrification of nitrates occurs, which creates nitrous oxide and nitric oxide gases that “can
contribute to air quality and greenhouse warming impacts.”162 The consequences of fossil fuel
dependency are just as alarming. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, American
agribusiness was responsible for 20 percent of the nation’s annual fossil fuel consumption, and
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for every calorie of fossil fuel expending in the industry, farmers produced less than one calorie
worth of food.163 In terms of energy, modern industrial agriculture is engaged in a system of
diminishing returns.
The effects of increased chemical dependencies in agriculture are clearly understood in
the twentieth-first century, but the origins of these developments can in part be traced back to the
rise of chemical high explosives in early twentieth-century agriculture. As ordinary farmers,
chemical manufacturers, and the agricultural state reinvented dynamite, they collectively used it
to expand farmlands into landscapes that lacked the ecological capacity support agricultural
production. Explosive blasts rationalized and streamlined these landscapes to accommodate farm
labor such as plowing, irrigation, and planting, but these developments both embodied and
further necessitated intensive farming techniques that, unbeknownst to contemporaries, catalyzed
new and unsustainable chemical dependencies in modern agriculture.

163

Tobias Plieninger, “Looking Beyond Corn and Petroleum,” Science Vol. 315, N0. 5816 (March 2,
2007), 1222; For more information on fossil fuel consumption in agriculture see Michael Pollen, The
Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).

92

Bibliography
Primary
Agricultural Experiment Station of the Colorado Agricultural College. Bulletin No. 187. 1913.
Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of Wisconsin. Bulletin No. 260. First Aid to
the Settler, by E, J, Delwiche,1915.
Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of Wisconsin. Bulletin No. 275. The Work of
the Experiment Stations and Agricultural Extension Services for 1916. 1917.
Agricultural Experiment Station Kansas State Agricultural College. Bulletin No. 209. The Use of
Dynamite in the Improvement of Heavy Clay Soils. 1915.
American Agriculturalist, 1887 [1 article]
American Farmer, 1876 [1 article]
Annual Report of the Pennsylvania State College for the Year 1913-1914, Part II: The
Agricultural Experiment Station. Harrisburg: WM. Stanley Ray, State Printer, 1915.
Bickford, F. H., Report of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting of the Vermont Dairymen’s
Association at Burlington, Vermont, January 8, 9, 1913, St. Albans: St. Albans
Messenger Co. Print, 1913.
Beach, Alfred Ely, ed.. “The Government Work at Hellgate” Science Record For 1872: A
Compendium of Scientific Progress and Discovery During the Past Year. Vol. 1. New
York: Munn and Company, Office of the “Scientific American,” 1872.
Brainerd Daily Dispatch, 1921 [2 articles]
Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburg Railway Company. Intensive Farming and Use of Dynamite.
Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press, 1911.
Buhler, E. O.. “New Facts and Figures.” Minutes and Papers of the Third Annual Tri-State
Development Congress of Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota. 1923.
Chicago Daily Tribune, 1907 [1 article]
Chicago Tribune, 1878-1909 [5 articles]
Christian Union, 1875 [1 article]
Colman’s Rural World, 1915 [1 article]

93

Cornell Countryman, 1919 [1 article]
Country Gentleman’s Magazine, 1874 [1 article]
Du Pont Magazine, 1913-1929 [8 articles]
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company. “The Builder of Nations—Dynamite.” Advertisement.
Literary Digest, February 23, 1918, 61.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company. Clearing Logged off Lands: Instruction in the Use of
Explosives for Clearing and Draining Land, tree Planting, Subsoiling and other
Purposes. 1923.
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company. “Does Labor Shortage Worry You?” Advertisement.
Progressive Farmer, December 7, 1918, 5.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Company. Du Pont Farmer’s Handbook: Instruction in the
Use of Dynamite for Clearing Planting and Cultivating Trees, Drainage, Ditching and
Subsoiling. Wilmington, 1912.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Company. Farming with Dynamite: An Improvement in
Farming that is Proving Greater Than Irrigation, 1911.
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company. “Is Your Problem Lack of Labor?” Advertisement.
Literary Digest, March 23, 1918, 54.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company. New Farms for Old Through Deep Plowing, with Du
Pont Red Cross Low Freezing Dynamite. Wilmington, 1911.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company. The history of the E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder
Company: A Century of Progress. New York: Business America, 1912.
Earle, F. S.. Southern Agriculture. New York: Macmillam Company, 1908
Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature, 1898 [1 article]
Eighteenth Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, 1912, Harrisburg: W.
M. Stanley Ray, State Printer, 1914.
Eleventh Annual Report of the Secretary of the Connecticut Board of Agriculture. 1878.
Engineering News-Record, 1923 [1 article]
Etcheverry, B. A.. Irrigation Practice and Engineering: Conveyance of Water. New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1915.
Farm Mechanics, 1921-1924 [2 articles]
94

Farm, Stock, and Home, 1917 [1 article]
Fifth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Vermont, 1913.
Friend, 1876 [1 article]
Greeley, W. B.. “The Relation of Geography to Timber Supply.” Economic Geography Vol. 1,
No. 1. March 1925.
Harvey, George B.M.. The North American Review, New York, 1899.
Hercules Powder Company. “Dynamite Makes Fertile Fields of Swamp Land.” Advertisement.
Literary Digest. October 4, 1919, 72.
Galaxy, 1874 [1 article]
Independent, 1882 [1 article]
Independent Statesman, 1887 [1 article]
Indiana Farmers Guide, 1918 [1 article]
Indiana School Journal: Organ of the State Teachers’ Association and of the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, 1876 [1 article]
Kansas State Agricultural College Agricultural Experiment Station. Bulletin No. 209: The Use of
Dynamite in the Improvement of Heavy Clay Soils. 1915.
Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station. Bulletin No. 154: Blowing Stumps with Dynamite.
1911.
Los Angeles Aqueduct-Final Report, 1916.
Lowe, Deo D.. “Making Prairies and Multiplying Manpower by Clearing Cutover Lands in
Coastal Plain Section” Manufacturers Record. September 24, 1919.
Official Gazette of the United States Patent Office, vol. 1, Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1875.
Orchard and Farm Consolidated with Irrigation, vol. 27, San Francisco: Country Life
Publishing Company, 1915.
Oregon Agricultural Experiment Station. Bulletin 45. 1897.
Magazine of Western History, 1886 [1 article]

95

Marsh, Barton W.. The Uncompahgre Valley and the Gunnison Tunnel: A Description of
Scenery, Natural Resources, Products, Industries, Exploration, Adventure, Etc..
Montrose: Marsh and Torrence, 1905.
McAdams, A. J.. “Land-Clearing Robbed of Its Drudgery.” Michigan Farmer. October 21, 1922.
McKee, James A.. 20th Century History of Butler and Butler County, Pa. and Representative
Citizens. Chicago: Richmond-Arnold Publishing Co., 1909.
Michigan State Board of Agriculture. Michigan State Farmers’ Institute, Bulletin No. 15. 1909.
Minutes and Papers of the Third Annual Tri-State Development Congress of Wisconsin,
Michigan and Minnesota. 1922.
Mississippi Agricultural Experiment Station Agricultural College, Mississippi. Bulletin No. 152:
Inspection and Analysis of Commercial Feedingstuffs. 1911.
Montana Agricultural Experiment Station. Circular 29. 1913.
Most, Johann, Revolutionary War Science: A Little Handbook of Instruction in the Use and
Preparation of Nitroglycerine, Dynamite, Gun-Cotton, Fulminating Mercury, Bombs,
Fuses, Poisons, etc., etc., 1885.
National Magazine, 1911 [1 article]
New England Farmer, and Horticultural Register, 1884 [1 article]
New York Evangelist, 1882-1885 [2 articles]
New York Observer and Chronicle, 1876 [1 article]
New York Times, 1882-1907 [9 articles]
North American Review, 1891 [1 article]
North Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station. Thirteenth Annual Report. 1903.
Ohio Farmer, 1889 [1 article]
Our Horticultural Visitor. 1898 [1 article]
Paint, Oil and Drug Review, 1895 [1 issue]
Pennsylvania Railroad. Increasing the Crop Per Acre: Use of Dynamite on the Farm, 1911.
Pennsylvania State College. Annual Report of the Pennsylvania State College for the Year 19061907. 1908.

96

Popular Science Monthly, 1922-1927 [3 articles]
Power Farming: The Magazine of Farming With Mechanical Power, 1919 [1 article]
Powers v. Harlow, 53 Michigan, 507, 1884.
Prairie Farmer, 1871 [1 article]
Railway Times, 1868 [2 articles]
Railway World, 1911 [2 articles]
Sailor’s Magazine and Seamen’s Friend, 1876 [ 1 article]
Schwantes, A. J.. “Dynamite a Form of Farm Power.” Better Farm Equipment and Methods.
November 1929.
Scientific American, 1866-1871 [2 articles]
Semi-Annual Digest of Co-operative Agricultural Extension Workers’ Activities, 1924 [1 article]
Seventeenth Annual Report of the Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of
Minnesota. Delano: The Eagle Printing Co., 1909.
Seymour, Edward Loomis Davenport, ed. Farm Knowledge: A Complete Manual of Successful
Farming Written by Recognized Authorities in All Parts of the Country; Based on Sound
Principles and the Actual Experiences of Real Farmers–“The Farmers’ Own
Cyclopedia” Garden City: Double Day, Page and Company, 1918.
Southern Cultivator, 1902-1906 [4 articles]
Southern Planter, 1899 [1 article]
State Horticultural Association of Pennsylvania. A list of Apples, Pears, Peaches, Plums and
Cherries. Harrisburg: Meyers Printing and Publishing House, 1889.
State Horticultural Society of Missouri. Forty-First Annual Report. 1898.
Swenehart, John. “The Utilization of Salvaged War Explosives in Cut Over Land Reclamation.”
Transaction of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers. Clemens: American
Society of Agricultural Engineers, 1925.
Thompson, M. J.. “The Land Clearing Movement in Minnesota.” Tri-State Development
Congress Minnesota—Wisconsin—Michigan: Report of Proceedings of the First

97

Convention Held at St. Paul, Minnesota, January 26-27, 1921. St. Paul: Webb
Publishing, 1921.
Twenty-Eight Annual Report of the Secretary of the State Board of Agriculture of the State of
Michigan From July 1, 1888 to June 30, 1889. 1889.
Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the New Jersey State Agricultural Experiment Station and the
Twenty-sixth Annual Report of the New Jersey Agricultural College Experiment Station
for the Year ending in October 31st, 1914.
Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the State Board of Agriculture of the State of Missouri For the
Year 1891. 1892.
Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Maine Agricultural Experiment Station, 1916.
True, Alfred Charles. A History of Agricultural Extension Work in the United States, 1785-1923.
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928.
Twenty-eighth Annual Report of the Secretary of the State Board of Agriculture of the State of
Michigan from July 1, 1888 to June 30, 1889. 1889.
Twenty-Second Annual Report of the University of Wyoming Agricultural Experiment Station,
1911-1912
University of California College of Agriculture. Agricultural Experiment Station. Report of the
Work of the Agricultural Experiment Stations of the University of California For the
Years 1892-93 and part of 1894. 1894.
University of Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station. Bulletin 163: Investigations in Costs
and Methods of Clearing Land, 1916.
University of Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station. Supplement to Bulletin 163. Forced
Vs. Delayed Systems of Clearing Stump Land, by M.J. Thompson, May 1920.
US Bureau of the Census. The Statistics of the Wealth and Industry of the United States.
Embracing the Tables of Wealth, Taxation, and Public Indebtedness; of Agriculture;
Manufactures; Mining; and the Fisheries, 1872.
US Congress, Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 53th Cong., 2nd
sess., 1894, 1259-1350.
US Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Plant Industry, The Work of the Belle Fourche
Reclamation Project Experiment Farm in 1913, By Beyer Aune, 1914.
US Department of Agriculture. Bureau of Soils. Soil Moisture: A Record of the Amount of Water
Contained in Soils During the Month of July, 1895. 1895.

98

US Department of Agriculture. Farmers’ Bulletin No. 150: Clearing New Land, by Frank
Williams Jr., 1902.
US Department of Agriculture. Miscellaneous Publication No. 15.: A History of Agricultural
Extension Work in the United States, 1785-1923, by Alfred Charles, 1928.
US Department of Agriculture. Office of Experiment Stations. Annual Report of the Office of
Experiment Stations For the Year Ended June 30, 1906. 1907.
US Department of Agriculture. Office of Experiment Stations. Annual Report of the Office of
Experiment Stations For the Year Ended June 30, 1910. 1911.
US Department of Agriculture. Office of Experiment Stations. Bulletin No. 119: Report of
Irrigation Investigations for 1901. 1902.
US Department of Agriculture. Office of Experiment Stations. Bulletin No. 236: The Use of
Underground Water for Irrigation at Pomona, California. 1911.
US Department of Agriculture. Office of Experiment Stations. Experiment Station Record. 1918.
US Department of Agriculture. Office of Experiment Stations. Report on the Agricultural
Experiment Stations, 1916. 1918.
US Department of Agriculture. Office of Experiment Stations. Work and Expenditures of the
Agricultural Experiment Stations 1917. 1918.
US Department of Agriculture. Statistical Reporting Service. Commercial Fertilizers:
Consumption of Commercial Fertilizers, Primary Plant Nutrients, and Micronutrients.
1971.
US Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census and US Department of Agriculture. Bureau
of Agricultural Economics. 1950 Census of Agriculture Special Reports: Agriculture
1950: A Graphic Summary. 1952.
US Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. United States Census of Agriculture, 1925:
Reports for States, With Statistics For Counties and a Summary For the United States
Part 3 The Western States. 1927.
US Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Fourteenth Census of the United States
Taken in the Year 1920. 1922.
US Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. United States Census of Agriculture, 1925:
Reports for States, With Statistics For Counties and a Summary For the United States
Part 1 The Northern States. 1927.

99

US Department of the Interior. Bureau of Mines. Safety and Efficiency in Mine Tunneling. 1914.
US Department of the Interior. Bureau of Reclamation. Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of Bureau of
Reclamation for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1926. 1926.
US Department of the Interior. Bureau of Reclamation. Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of Bureau
of Reclamation For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1925. 1925.
US Department of the Interior. Bureau of Reclamation. Twenty-Third Annual Report of Bureau
of Reclamation for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1924. 1924.
US Department of the Interior. Geological Survey. First Annual Report of the Reclamation
Service From June 17 to December 1, 1902, 1903
US Department of the Interior, Manual of the United States Reclamation Service, United States
Bureau of Reclamation, 1917.
US Department of the Interior. Reclamation Service. Annual Report From the Commissioner of
Reclamation to the Secretary of the Interior. 1946.
US Department of the Interior. Reclamation Service. Fifteenth Annual report of the Reclamation
Service, 1915-1916. 1916.
US Department of the Interior. Reclamation Service. Fourteenth Annual Report of the
Reclamation Service, 1914-1915, 1915.
US Department of the Interior. Reclamation Service. Nineteenth Annual Report of the
Reclamation Service, 1919-1920. 1920.
US Department of the Interior. Reclamation Service. Twelfth Annual report of the Reclamation
Service, 1912-1913. 1914.
US Department of the Interior. Reclamation Service. Twenty-Second Annual Report of the
Bureau of Reclamation, 1922-1923. 1923.
US Department of the Interior, The Reclamation Record, The Reclamation Service, Jan. 1921.
Vertical Farming, 1915-1917 [3 issue]
Warren, William Whipple. “Emigration of the Ojibways from the Shores of the Atlantic Ocean
to Their Occupation of the Area of Lake Superior.” History of the Ojibway People.
1885).
Washington State Agricultural College and School of Science Experiment Station, Bulletin 28.
1897.

100

Wilson, A. D., Vye, J. A. eds. Minnesota Farmers’ Institute Annual Number 26, St. Paul: The
Pioneer Company, 1912.
Secondary
Adamic, Louis. Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America. New York: The Viking
Press, 1934.
Andrews, Thomas. Killing for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2008.
Bailey, L. H.. The Country Life Movement in the United States. New York: MacMillan
Company, 1913.
Bowers, William L.. The Country Life Movement in America, 1900-1920. New York: Kennikat
Press, 1974.
Brinkman, George, ed. The Development of Rural America, Wichita: The Universty Press of
Kansas, 1974.
Brown, Stephen R.. A Most Damnable Invention: Dynamite, Nitrates, and the Making of the
Modern World. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2005.
Cochrane, Willard W.. The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
Cronon, William. Natures Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West. New York: W. W. Norton
and Company, 1991.
Danhof, Clarence H., Change in Agriculture: The Northern United States, 1820-1870.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.
Dutton, William S., Du Pont: One Hundred and Forty Years. New Work: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1942.
Dyer, Davis and David B Sicilia. Labors of a Modern Hercules: Evolution of a Chemical
Company. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1990.
Fitzgerald, Deborah. Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.
Follett, R. F. and J. A. Delgado. “Nitrogen Fate and Transport in Agricultural Systems.” Journal
of Soil and Water Conservation. Vol. 56, No. 6. November/December 2002.
Gerstle, Gary, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government From The Founding
to the Present. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
101

Green, James. Death in the Haymarket: A Story of Chicago, the First Labor Movement and the
Bombing that Divided Gilded Age America. New York: Anchor Books, 2006.
Grinde, Donald Andrew. “The Gunpowder Trade Association: A Search for Stability, 18721912.” PhD diss., University of Delaware, 1974.
Hagenstein, Edwin C., Gregg, Sara M., and Donahue, Brian, eds. American Georgics: Writings
on Farming, Culture, and the Land. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.
Hahn, Steven. A Nation Without Borders: The United States and its World in an Age of Civil
Wars, 1830-1910, New York: Penguin Books, 2016.
Hayami, Yujiro and Vernon Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
Hurst, James Willard. Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in
Wisconsin, 1836-1915. Washington: Belknap Press, 1964.
Jacoby, Karl. Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of
American Conservation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
Kelly, William R.. Laramie-Poudre Irrigation Co. Poudre Valley Canal, Greeley-Poudre
Irrigation District. 1964.
Kennedy, David. Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 19291945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Levy, Jonathan. Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012.
Lyon-Jenness, Cheryl. “Planting a Seed: The Nineteenth-Century Horticultural Boom in
America,” Business History Review, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Autumn, 2004).
Malone, Laurence J., Opening the West: Federal Internal Improvements Before 1860. Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1998
Martin, Konrad and Joachim Sauerborn, Agroecology. Dordrechts: Springer Science and
Business Media, 2013.
Mitchell, Timothy, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. New York: Verso,
2011.
Moss, Jeffery W. and Cynthia B. Lass, “A History of Farmers’ Institutes” Agricultural History
Vol. 62, No. 2, Spring 1988.
Okie, Tom. “Under the trees: The Georgia Peach and the Quest for Labor in the Twentieth

102

Century,” Agricultural History, vol. 85, no. 1, Winter 2001.
Olmstead, Alan L., Rhode, Paul W.. Creating Abundance: Biological Innovation and American
Agricultural Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Orsi, Richard J.. Sunset Limited: The Southern Pacific Railroad and the Development of the
American West. Berkley: University of California Press, 2005.
Pasani, Donald J.. From the Family Farm to Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade in California
and the West, 1850-1931. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
Platt, Harold L.. The Electric City: Energy and the Growth of the Chicago Area, 1880-1930.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Plieninger, Tobias. “Looking Beyond Corn and Petroleum,” Science. March 2, 2007.
Pollen, Michael. The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A History of Four Meals. New York: Penguin Press,
2006.
Sabin, Paul. Crude Politics: the California Oil Market, 1900-1940. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2005.
Shannon, Fred A.. The Farmer’s Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897. New York: Farrar and
Rinehard, Inc., 1945.
Shapiro, Aaron Alex “’One Crop Worth Cultivating’: Tourism in the Upper Great Lakes, 19101965.” PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2005.
Van Gelder, Arthur Pine and Hugo Schlatter, History of the Explosives Industry in America. New
York: Arno Press, 1927.
Vasey, Daniel E.. “The Rise of Industrial Agriculture” An Ecological History of Agriculture,
10,00- B.C. – 10,000 A.D. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1992.
White, Richard. Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011.
Wiebe, Robert. The Search for Order, 1877-1920. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.
Woeste, Victoria Saker. The Farmer’s Benevolent Trust: Law and Agricultural Cooperation in
Industrial American, 1865-1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
Worster, Donald. Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West. New
York: Pantheon Books, 1985.

103

